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SUMMARY 
(i) The Evolution of Human Consciousness and the Creation of 
the Soul. 
(ii) by M. J. van Heerden 
(iii) Degree: Master in Systematic Theology 
(iv) Subject: Systematic Theology 
(v) Promoter: Prof A. Konig 
(vii) Summary: 
Revelation is God's Word addressed to the human being and so 
speaks of God in relation to the person and the world. 
Revelation can therefore only be fully understood, proclaimed 
and lived through an encounter with the world and its 
conceptions. To understand the evolution of human consciousness 
and the creation of the soul, we look to the sources of 
revelation (scripture and tradition) in dialogue with secular 
anthropology. The latter's paradigm of development and growth 
is not foreign to the former's understanding of conversion and 
growth in grace . The image of God, which characterises the 
human person, is shown to be an emergent likeness, which is 
created and drawn to its fullness by God. This accounts for 
Pius XII' s insistence that the soul is created immediately by 
God, who is responsible for the physical dynamics that bring 
forth consciousness and the personal dynamics that empower the 
human soul to develop. 
(viii) Keyterms: 
Anthropology of Old and New Testament; Image of God; 
Personhood and Relationality; Secular Anthropology; Double 
Instinct and Original Sin; Evolution and Aspect Theory; 
Evolutionism; Teleonomy of Structural Growth; Invariant 
Structure of Consciousness. 
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Introduction 
All absolute beginnings are mysterious, for, however much we 
explore them, there is always something which seems to escape 
analysis. This is probably because we cannot relive that 
beginning and will always view it from another vantage-point of 
time and space. This simple fact is equally applicable to the 
analysis of the human person, for here too. we touch mystery. In 
discussing then the evolution of human consciousness and the 
creation of the 1 soul 1 , we are faced by a double mystery, for 
not only are we examining a beginning far removed from our 
present reality, but we are also touching upon the mystery of 
personhood. 
In 1950 Pope Pius XII, in response to the growing debate on 
evolution in the church and world, issued an Encyclical Letter: 
Humani Generis. In this he stated: 1 
"The Church does not forbid that the doctrine of evolution, 
in so far as it inquires into the origin of the human body 
from already existing and living matter, be, according to 
the present state of human discipline and sacred theology, 
treated in research and discussion by experts on both 
sides; as to the souls, the Catholic Faith demands us to 
hold that they are immediately created by God." 
This study will attempt to examine what the implications of this 
stance are. It will be our contention that despite the double 
1. J. Neuner and J. Dupuis, 
1n the Doctrinal Documents 
Mercier Press), n 419 
editors, 1976, The Christian Faith 
of the Catholic Church; (Dublin: 
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obstacle facing us when examining our beginnings, we do have 
three important guidelines in our quest. Firstly, the biblical 
understanding of the human person in so far as it has been 
inspired by the Holy Spirit, is our normative but not exclusive 
guide to this mystery. We will begin by looking at this 
biblical witness; but, secondly, the other conceptions of the 
human person that have evolved in the thinking of people, it is 
believed, help us to deepen our perception and appreciation of 
the biblical message. Chapter 2, therefore, examines the 
understanding of the human condition as it has been portrayed in 
the different fields of human endeavour. Thirdly, because we 
are a "dasein" or a being in the world, we believe that 
creation's fingerprint is embedded within our nature. 
In chapter 3, therefore, with the biblical and scientific 
witness in mind, we explore how, on reflecting on our own growth 
and on the dynamics of our own life, we can make final sense of 
the evolution of human consciousness and the immediate creation 
of our 'souls' by God. 
Chapter 1 
Anthropology in Judaic/ Christian 
Heritage 
1.1. Anthropology in Old and New Testaments 
1.1.1. General 
3 
Even at a superficial glance it is clear that none of the 
writings of the Old or New Testament represents a conscious 
attempt to produce a systematic anthropology either from a 
theological, philosophical or scientific point of view. On the 
other hand, it is also true to say that every historical 
understanding of the world has, prior to it, but inseparably 
connected with it, a corresponding self-understanding of the 
human person. Most of the religious traditions of contemporary 
times view the body and soul as the two component parts of a 
human person. This is foreign to the biblical mentality, for 
concepts such as 1 soul 1 , 1 flesh 1 , 1 heart 1 or 1 spirit 1 express 
the whole person in his or her different aspects. In the view 
of Greek philosophy, the concern in anthropology is to analyse a 
person as a microcosm who unites two worlds - the spiritual and 
the material. Biblical Theology, on the other hand, looks at 
4 
the human person primarily in his/her relation to God whose 
image they are. As Xavier Leon-Dufour sums up: 1 
"Instead of enclosing itself in a natural and closed world, 
the Bible opens up the scene to the dimensions of history 
in which the principal actor is God, the God who created 
man and Himself became man in order to redeem him". 
So the historical understanding of the world and creation in the 
Bible corresponds to a theological anthropology and all the 
major dogmatic statements of the scriptures involve in the last 
analysis, an understanding of the human person and his/her 
situation. To the extent that this explication of the human 
person's understanding of his or her self has been inspired by 
the Holy Spirit, to that extent it can claim to be foremost in 
bringing us to an experiential knowledge of our proper nature. 
1.1.2. Terms that characterise the Human Person 
1.1.2.1 Soul 
In the bibilical languages the terms which designate the soul: 
nephesh (n) , psyche: · are all connected more or less directly 
with the idea of breath. Breath or respiration is, after all, 
the ordinary sign of life. To be alive is still to have breath 
in oneself (2 S 1:9; Ac 20:10). When a person dies the soul 
leaves (Gn 35:18); is exhaled (Jr 15:9); or is poured out like a 
liquid (Is 53:12) . If the person comes back to life the soul 
returns to him/her (1 K 17:21). In stereometric 
1. Xavier Leon-Dufour, 1973, editor, Dictionary of Biblital 
Theology, 1 vol. (New York: Seabury Press), Man, by Xavier Leon-
Dufour, p.328 
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synthetic thinking it is very common to see a part of the body 
together with its particular activities and capacities, as being 
distinguishing marks of the whole person. So in Hebrew, for 
example, one and the same word can be used where we need widely 
different words. Soul or n can, therefore, also designate the 
throat (Is 5:14); the neck (Ps 105:18); or even more broadly 
speaking desire as a vital longing, desiring or yearning after 
(Ps 35:25). Perhaps the broadest extension of the meaning of 
soul is when n is moved from a specific organ or act of desire, 
to the seat and action of other spiritual experiences and 
emotions as well (Ex 23:9). Here the writer is thinking not 
only of the stranger's needs and desires but of the whole range 
of his feelings. At its broadest extension n can, therefore, 
appear as an exact synonym for life (Dt 12:23) Here a complete 
identification of blood and life has taken place. Lv 17:11 puts 
it even more clearly: the n of the flesh is in the blood. From 
the meaning of living the term passes easily to that of life as 
the parallel uses of the two terms show (Ps 74:19). Elsewhere 
in the law of retaliation soul for soul can be translated 'life 
for 1 if e 1 (Ex 21 : 2 3) . Objectively then every living being can 
be called soul, even the animal (Gn 1:20; 2:19); but more 
commonly subjectively the soul corresponds to our 1 I 1 , just as 
heart or flesh, but with a nuance of interiority and living 
power (Dt 32:40; Am 6:8; 2 Co 1:23). However, n is never given 
the meaning of an indestructible core of being in contra 
distinction to the physical life or even capable of living when 
cut off from life. This is summed up by Wolff as follows: 2 
2. Hans Walter Wolff, 1974, Anthropology of the Old Testament, 
(London: SCM Press, pp. 24-25) 
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"If we survey the wide context in which the n. of man and 
man as n. can be observed, we see above all man marked out 
as the individual living being who has neither acquired, 
nor can preserve, life by himself, but who is eager for 
life, spurred on by vital desire, as the throat (the organ 
for receiving nourishment and for breathing) and the neck 
(as the part of the body which is especially at risk) make 
clear." 
For the Semites it is not the soul, but God, who by God's spirit 
is the source of life: "God breathed in his nostril a breath of 
life, and man became a living soul 




(Gn 2: 7} . The soul 
spirit (pneuma), or 
source of life, are thus distinguished one from the other at the 
heart of the human being where only the word of God can have 
access (Heb 4:12) . This distinction is at the heart of the 
words of Jesus: "he who wishes to save his soul will lose it, 
but he who loses his soul for my sake will find it" (Mt 16: 25f; 
cf Mt 10:39; Lk 14:26; 17:33; Jn 12:25). Under these conditions 
the "salvation of the soul" is ultimately the victory of eternal 
life lodged in the soul (Jm 1:21; 5:20; 1 P 1:9; Heb 10:39). So 
the soul can die (Nb. 23:10; Jg 16:30; Ezk 13:19) just like 
bones (Ezk 37: 1-14) or flesh (Ps 63:2). The soul descends to 
Sheol to lead the impoverished existence of the shadows, far 
from the land of the living, far also from God whom it can no 
longer praise (Ps 88:11ff). However, the omnipotence of God 
will grant the soul descended into the depths of the abyss (Pr 
2 3: 14) , to raise from there ( 2 M 7: 9) , and to reanimate the 
dispersed bones. For Wisdom literature the souls go to Hades 
(Ws 16:14), but God who has them in God's hand (Ws 3:1; .4:14) 
7 
can raise them up again because God has created the person 
incorruptible (Ws 2:23). 
eternity which comes to 
God has placed 
flower in its 
in 
own 
the soul a seed of 
time. The whole 
person will again become a "living soul" and as Paul says "a 
spiritual body" will rise again in its integrity (1 Co 15:45). 
1.1.2.2 Flesh 
Scripture never considers flesh (basar) as intrinsically evil 
for its judgement of flesh is not clarified by a philosophical 
speculation but by the light of revelation: flesh has been 
created by God, it has been assumed by the son of God and flesh 
is transfigured by the Spirit of God. However, in the 
scriptures, from beginning to end, flesh always designates the 
status of creature. The dignity of the flesh is seen in the 
fact that it is fashioned by God as by a weaver (Jb 10:11; 
(Ps 139:13ff) or a potter (Gn 2:7; Jr 1:5) Whether the flesh 
be an element of our corporeal being such as in flesh and blood 
(Si 14:18; Mt 16:17) or whether it denotes the body as a whole; 
for example in its sickness (Ps 38:4; Ga 4:14), or in 
tribulations (1 Co 7:28), a hint of contempt is never found in 
its regard, for flesh cannot be hated (Ep 5: 28f) . In fact, the 
eulogy of the flesh reaches its high point when Ezekiel 
announces that God will replace Israel's hardened and stoney 
heart with "a heart of flesh" (Ezk 36:26) Flesh can also 
denote a person in their concrete totality as the Semites use 
the term soul to speak of all people. They also speak 
objectively of "all flesh" to mean the whole animated creation 
(Gn 6:17; Ps 136:25). Ordinarily in the scripture, however, to 
8 
speak of flesh is to speak of the frailty of a creature; while 
nephesh in the Old Testament is applied in 3% of the cases to 
Yahweh, basar is applied in not a single instance. 
cases Wolff says: 3 
In these 
"Basar always describes restricted, insufficient human 
power in contrast to the surpassing power of God, which is 
alone worthy of trust." 
Flesh is to spirit, as the earthly is to the heavenly, thus 
Jesus Christ, "descended from the line of David according to the 
flesh, has been proven son of God with power according to the 
Spirit of holiness" (Rm 1:3f; cf 1 Tm 3:16). Through his or her 
flesh which is no more than "dust" (Gn 3:19) a person belongs to 
the terrestial world. Through the breath which God lends them 
people are related to the celestial world (Jn 6:63) . That is 
also why it 
before God 
is all flesh that also brings the weight of sin 
(Ps 65:2f). When adopted as . the norm of existence 
independent of God the flesh begins to dictate the human 
conduct. It acquires a real autonomy and inherits from the 
power of sin both its prerogatives and its desires. It is this 
that is behind the Pauline recognition that "nothing good dwells 
in my flesh" (Rm 7: 5, 18) . It is the same with the body, in 
itself neutral: when under the command of the flesh, it 
acquires the name of "the body of the flesh" (Col 2: 11) It 
then becomes identified with this "body of sin" (Rm 6:6) . 
Christ who took this body of flesh (Col 1:22), and was made sin 
(2 Co 5: 21), has conquered sin, so in Christ the Christian has 
henceforth crucified his flesh and as 
3 . Ibid. I p. 3 0 
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Xavier Leon-Dufour says: 4 
"the fight that he carries on (Ga 6:8) does not end 
fatally, rather he is assured of victory according to the 
measure in which he recognises his real condition of 
creature and puts his trust not in the flesh, in his 
weakness, but in the strength of the Saviour's death, which 
is the source of the Spirit of life". 
1.1.2.3 Spirit 
The Hebrew word ruah, as indeed the Greek word pneuma, or Latin 
word spiritus, are all terms borrowed from the natural phenomena 
of wind and breath, but they all three do not admit translation 
by any single English word. Nor is it entirely correct to say 
that these words sometimes mean breath) sometimes wind1 or 
sometimes spirit. This_is probably because while there are many 
different nuances there are also real analogies in each use. 
Furthe~ ruah or spirit more often refers to God than to people 
and so is properly known as a thee-anthropological term. Jesus 
himself points to the mystery· that is the wind (Jn 3:8). 
Sometimes of an irresistible violence it strikes houses, cedar 
trees, ships of the high sea (Ezk 13:13); whereas sometimes it 
insinuates itself in a murmur (1 K 19:12) and spreads over the 
fruitful water enabling it to bring forth life ( 1 K 18:45) . 
Spirit sometimes signifies the breath (Jb 19: 17) , breath here 
being conceived as either the sign and principle of life 
(Ps 31:6), or as something unsubstantial for example, a person 
4. Xavier Leon-Dufour, 1973, editor, Dictionary of Biblical 
Theology, 1 Vol. (New York: Seabury Press), Flesh, by Xavier 
Leon-Dufour, p. 188 
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can utter windy words (Jb 16:3) and likewise the false prophets 
are spirit (Jr 5:13) . Sometimes the consciousness of a person 
seems to be invaded by a strange power which is not properly 
their own, one which can only be called a spirit. This can be 
an evil force (Nb 5: 14-30) or it can be a beneficient spirit 
(Zc 12:10) With an incomplete understanding of the nature of 
Satan the Old Testament is reluctant to attribute the perverse 
spirits to someone other than God (cf Jg 9:23; 1 S 19:9) but it 
does, however, always affirm the good spirits come directly from 
God. It is this latter usage that dominates the anthropological 
usage of ruah in the Old Testament. A person's breathing comes 
from God (Gn 2:7; Jb 33:4), and returns to God at death 
(Jb 34:14; Ws 15:11) Life and death, therefore, depend on the 
breath that comes from God. Ruah used in anthropological sense 
is then primarily a person as he/ she is empowered by God. In 
the Old Testament the Spirit of God is not yet revealed as a 
person but as a divine force transforming human personalities in 
order to make them capable of exceptional deeds. It is almost 
like an assembly of powers which can be distributed to a great 
many people. As the spirit comes from God and leads back to God 
it is a holy Spirit, one that sanctifies. This action and this 
revelation of God's Spirit is, according to Jacques Guillet, 5 
especially evidence within the prophetic tradition. The 
Prophets have a special calling and duty and are fully conscious 
of the sovereign pressure which constrains them to speak 
(Am 3:8; Jr 20:7ff). This connection between the Word of God and 
God's Spirit shows itself as early as Elijah (l K l9:12f). The 
5. Xavier Leon-Dufour, editor, 1973, Dictionary of Biblical 
Theology, (New York, Seabury Press), Spirit of God, by Jacques 
Guillet, pp.571-577 
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Spirit opens them to the Word of God (Ezk 3:12; 8:3) and makes 
them speak to the people to proclaim the judgement which is 
coming (Ezk 11:5). This is fully affirmed in the Servant of 
Yahweh. Guillet sums this up as follows: 6 
"Because God "has sent His spirit upon him," the Servant 
"will proclaim justice to the nations" (Is 42:1; 
cf 61:1ff). It is the Prophet who proclaims justice, but 
the King who establishes it. But the Servant "through his 
sufferings will justify the multitudes" (53: 11), that is, 
he will establish them in justice. So his mission includes 
something royal in it. The prophetic tasks and the 
Messianic tasks are united, achieved through the same 
Spirit." 
This action of the Spirit in the Prophets and the Servants of 
God is like a new creation, the coming of right and justice in a 
land renewed (Is 32:16) . The fruits of this outpouring are a 
sense of supplication (Zc 12:10), and of praise (Ps 51:17), a 
spontaneous faithfulness to God•s Word (Is 59:21; Ps 143:10), 
and to God•s Covenant (Ezk 36:27) This regeneration by the 
Spirit will mean that God will once again find God•s people and 
Israel will recognise her God (Ezk 39:29): In the Old Testament 
this vision is still only a hope while the Spirit is an 
invisible independent being. It is not yet conceived as being 
Yahweh • s ruah in the absolute sense. McKenzie summarises this 
as follows: 7 
"In summary, the spirit in the Old Testament, originally 
6. Ibid., p. 572 
7. John. L. McKenzie, 1965, Dictionary of the Bible, (London: 
Geoffrey Chapman), p.841 
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the wind and the breath, is conceived as a divine dynamic 
entity by which Yahweh accomplishes his end: it saves, as 
a creative and charismatic power, and as a agent of his 
anger it is a demonic power. It remains impersonal. 
Because the people are always able to sadden the Holy Spirit 
(Is 63:10), and paralyse the Spirit's action, God must give an 
unprecedented sign that God intervenes in person. The Word of 
God is revelation and penetrates from the outside, the Spirit is 
fluid and remains invisible leading to an interior 
transformation. This need and division brings us to the 
doorstep of the New Testament: for in Christ the Word of God 
made flesh through the operation of the Spirit always works 
through the Spirit and the consummation of his work is a gift of 
the Spirit. So in the Son the New Testament reveals that the 
'-
Spirit of God cannot be separated either from the Father or the 
Son. In Jesus, however, the Spirit does not bring about a new 
personality, for, from his first instant the Spirit causes him 
to exist and dwells in him constituting him as the Son of God 
(Mt 1:20; Lk 1:35) . Always living in the presence of God, the 
miracles flow from him as a simple gesture: confronting the 
devil (Mt 4:1), bringing to the poor the good news of the Word 
of God ( Lk 4 : 18 ) Jesus thus shows that he possesses the Spirit 
as none other (Jn 3: 34) . The Spirit does not invade him from 
outside, he is in the Spirit and the Spirit is in him. It is 
his own Spirit (cf Jn 16:14f). It is the same Spirit that Jesus 
promises to his disciples. As long as he was living with them 
he was their Paraclete (Jn 17:12), but when he departs the 
Spirit will take his place (Jn 14:16). While distinct from 
Jesus the Spirit does not speak ~ndependent of him (Jn 16:13f), 
13 
rather he enables the disciples to recall the words and works of 
Jesus giving them an understanding of these and enabling them to 
confront the world in Jesus' name (Jn 14:26). The Acts of the 
Apostles is really a gospel of the Spirit showing how the church 
as a new creation is born from this pouring forth of Christ's 
Spirit. The same Spirit takes hold of the pagans (Ac 10:44) , 
and is the interior source of the forward thrust of all 
missionary activity (Ac 13:52). For Paul to be in Christ is to 
live in the Spirit (Rm 8: 1) . For the Spirit who raises Jesus 
(Rm 8:11) and makes him a "living spirit" (1 Co 15:45) is the 
same Spirit that transforms us into his image. The Old Covenant 
which killed and held us as prisoners in the decay of the Law 
gives way now to the Covenant of the Spirit which brings life 
(2 Co 3:6) . Segundo describes this dynamic in the following 
way: 8 
"God does not want to give us a declaration of justice that 
would place us somewhere we have no right to be. The gift 
that God gives human beings in Jesus Christ is the 
possibility of a coherent maturity of complete fulfillment 
as human beings; and this presupposes replacing the 
mechanisms of the Flesh with those of the Spirit." 
In the Spirit we lack no other gift (1 Co 1:7), as the pledge 
and first fruit (2 Co 1:22; 5:5; Ep 1:14; Rm 8:23), the Spirit 
helps us to fight against the mechanisms of the flesh and 
transforms us into spiritual people (1 Co 3:1). The same Spirit 
is a Spirit of communion which draws all together into Christ's 
own unity consecrating the temple of God (1 Co 3:16; Ep 2:22), 
8. Juan L. Segundo, 1986, The Humanist Christology of Paul, (New 
York: Orbis Books), p. 56 
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to confess that Jesus is Lord (1 Co 12:3), and addressing God as 
Father (Rm 8:15; Ga 4:6). For Segundo: 9 
"The real victory of· Jesus does not change the "appearance" 
of defeat on the verifiable level. It operates on a deeper 
level, in which we must believe as we believe in his 
Resurrection, the first fruit and pledge of our own 
resurrection and that of all human beings that is why 
Paul locates the crucial human quality not so much in love 
(the result) as in the inner mechanism that is capable of 
directing all the energies of the human being into the 
creative project of love: that is, Faith (Ga 5:6) ." 
1.1.2.4 Heart 
In Old Testament anthropology the term generally translated as 
I 
heart is probably the most important word applying to people and 
is used almost exclusively for human beings. Leb is its 
commonest form and it occurs five hundred and ninety-eight times 
in the Hebrew Old Testament, in the form Lebab it occurs two 
hundred and fifty-two times. Since it denotes the place in the 
human being where vital decisions are made and where the 
essential spiritual and mental activities take place, the heart 
stands, therefore, for the inaccessible and inexplorable in a 
human being, that which is impenetrably hidden just as the 
physical heart is the inaccessibly hidden organ inside the body. 
In a few cases that the heart is spoken of in contexts other 
than man or woman such as in Pr 30:18f, where the heart of the 
sea is spoken about, what is meant, therefore; is the high seas 
9. Ibid., pp.l32-133 
15 
or the unexplored open seas. In the first place the heart is in 
human beings the seat of feelings where pain, fear, courage, 
anger and sadness occur (Ps 25:17; Is 7:2; 1 S 17:32; Ps 27:14; 
Pr 23:17; Pr 17:22). Not only do these and other feelings occur 
in the heart, but the heart can also be the place where wishes 
and desires take root (Pr 6:25). Here desire and longing, pride 
and arrogance all occur (Jr 49:16; Is 9:9). Wolff notes in this 
regard: 10 
"This linguistic usage is worth noticing as the background 
to the single New Testament passage which speaks about the 
heart of Jesus (Matt 11:29): I am gentle and lowly in 
heart. The counter images of hubris in the Old Testament 
are an urgent injunction to the invitation of Jesus." 
Intellectual rational functions are, however, by far the 
greatest number of cases ascribed to the heart. This is why the 
heart and the ear often stand parallel to one another as the 
basis of perceptive reason (Pr 18:15), as is the ear also often 
mentioned with the heart (Dt 29:4; Is 6:10); timhon lebab, as it 
occurs in Dt 28:28 is to be understood as confusion of mind. So 
the activities _that we normally ascribe to head or brain are for 
the biblical mentality activities of the heart, for example, 
memory (Dn 7:28), thinking (1 S 9:20), understanding (Jb 12:3) 
and enduring consciousness (Dt 6: 6) . It is also in the heart 
that decisions of the will occur: as a transition from 
deliberation to action (Pr 16:9), deliberation of intentions 
(2 S 7:3), and the conscious obedience of the will (1 K 8:61; 
2 K 20:3). Wolff sums this up as follows: 11 
10. Wolff, Anthropology, p.46 
11. Ibid., p. 55 
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"But though it undoubtedly embraces the whole range of the 
physical, the emotional and the intellectual, as well as 
the functions of the will, yet we must clearly hold on to 
the fact that the Bible primarily views the heart as the 
centre of the consciously living man. The essential 
characteristic that, broadly speaking, dominates the 
concept is that the heart is called to reason, and 
especially to hear the Word of God." 
It is against this background that the phrases hardness of heart 
and the heart of God are most clearly understandable. Hardness 
of heart is the progressive sclerosis of a person who is 
separated from God. This shows God's patience for God extends 
God's hand to the person or people who rebel (Ex 4:21; Mt 13:13; 
-Rm 10:21; cf Ho 11:1f; Jr 7:25; Ne 9:30). God might extend 
God's hand through divine chastisements (Am 4:6-11), or through 
·- prophetic appeals (2 K 17:13f; Jr 7:25ff), but_ .since light 
blinds those who are not disposed to receive it (Jn 3: 19ff) 
God's love stimulates in the sinner a reaction of refusal. So, 
when God hardens the heart of a person, God is not the source 
but the judge of the sin. The Semite attributes, therefore, to 
God a positive will to do what God is content with permitting. 
This determinism of sin cannot cease except by conversion made 
possible by the Spirit of God (Hb 3:7f; Ez 36:26f). When in the 
scriptures the heart of God is mentione~what is always implied 
is God's relationship to a person or people and the organ of 
this is God's distinct will ( 1 S 2:35) . When God's heart is 
overthrown within God (Gn 19:25; cf. Am 4:11; Dt 29:23) it means 
God's deliberate decision is changed showing forth the power of 
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God's decision for mercy and the fervour of God's kindness 
towards people. 
1.1.3. Image of God 
1.1.3 .1 God's Address 
Human beings are called into life by God's Word which confers on 
them the office that distinguishes them from the rest of 
creation (Gn 1:28; Ps 8:5). Once this Word of God is uttered 
humans have an inalienable responsibility for their own acts 
(Gn 2:16f). This is even more clearly brought out in the 
creation accounts of the Old Testament. In the Yahwistic 
account of creation the interest is directed towards the 
relationships in which a person is from the very beginning 
compelled to recognise their distinctiveness as humans.- Since a 
person receives their form and life from God this fact 
establishes their prime relationship (Gn 2:7) From the great 
gambit of creation myths in the ancient East the fact that the 
Israelite writers only chose the craftsmanship motifs stresses, 
according to Wolff12 , the distance between God and people, but 
also God's concrete intervention on behalf of the human being. 
A bond showed essentially in Yahweh's Word of address. This 
same Word also establishes a human being's second relationship, 
i.e., the human's relationship to animals. Since man is called 
to name the beasts, this manifests his first autonomy within 
creation (Gn 2:20). The third relationship is Yahweh's decision 
12. Ibid., p. 93-94 
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to give man a female companion, the uniqueness of which is 
underlined by the fact that she is created not from the earth, 
but out of the rib of man himself (Gn 2:22) , and that man is 
capable of recognising that she is truly "flesh of my flesh" 
(Gn 2:23). The fourth and final relationship established by the 
Yahwistic account is the one between people and the earth. 
Created out of the earth (Gn 2:7), a person is called to work 
the soil (Gn 3:23), and since he/she returns to the earth at 
death (Gn 3:19), the earth is the pertinent reminder of his/her 
mortality. 
"It is text 
Wolff sums up this relationship as follows: 13 
documented linguistically in the original 
the consonants of 'adam' (man) and the through 
(earth), 
'dama' 
in which the common etymological route 'dm', "to 
be red"~ appears for man's reddish-brown skin and for the 
reddish-brown of the earth. This relation too is 
determined by Yahweh." 
1.1.3.2 Stewardship 
In Gn 1:26, the Priestly author uses a novel literary device and 
pictures Elohim as taking counsel with the mysterious beings who 
make up the heavenly court before proceeding to the decisive 
action. This device exalts the creation of human beings. On 
the one hand, man and woman are like God as God's image. On the 
other hand, they are masters over all the animals. The terms 
"image and likeness" do not assign two distinct meanings. They 
merely suggest that man and woman are a successful image without 
13. Ibid. , p. 94 
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implying an out and out identification with God. The second 
formula serves as a sort of explanatory phrase to temper the 
realism of the first. Human beings are in the image of God but 
are not to be confused with God. This "likeness" needs 
determination: it is true that the Hebrews sometimes ascribe 
physical characteristics to God (cf Ps 75:8), but since the 
Priestly author pictures the Creator with certain 
characteristics such as speaking, making and seeing, this 
description more likely invites us to find in human beings these 
same details in the concrete (cf Ps 115: 28) Like God, human 
beings can think, speak and act and judge their works. In other 
words, like God, human beings are personal beings. Later 
Judaism will deepen and spiritualise this theme of the image of 
God (cf Ws 2 :23), and Paul will give it its definitive 
development (cf 1 Co 11:7; 2 Co 3:18; 
of the Creator human beings exercise 
Col 3: 10) In imitation 
a delegated_, overlordship 
over all the animals of the earth. In the ancient East when the 
statue of a King was set up 
dominion was proclaimed over 
at a certain place the King's 
that sphere (cf Dn 3:1,5f), so 
human beings are set up in the midst of creation as the statue 
of God. The sabbath rest gives human beings the occasion to 
enjoy the lordly repose of the Creator. From this it may be 
understood why the Psalmist gave such fervent expression to the 
wonder and gratitude evoked by this idea (cf Ps 8:5-16). In the 
Yahwistic theology of creation the animals also were made by God 
from the dust of the earth and received the breath of life from 
the Creator (Gn 2:19; cf Gn 6:17; Gn 7:22) Indeed, as we have 
seen in much Old Testament theology man, woman and beast have 
the same "life breath" (Qo 3:19). This theology might seem to 
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rob the human being of his/her place of privilege, but, as 
Charles Hauret explains: 14 
"There is both truth and falsity to all this. There is 
truth because, like the animal, man is a "dust that 
breathes," and like the animal, he has his origin from God 
who formed them both. There is falsity because, unlike the 
beasts of the field and the birds of the air, man is also a 
"dust that thinks". He can know the nature of animals 
(Gn 2: 19-20), and is· master of his own fate (Gn 3) As a 
privileged creature he deserves special attention of the 
narrator who, by his special staging of the scene of his 
origin shows man, and man alone, as the object of a special 
intervention of God." 
As the "dust that thinks" human beings have the commission to 
establish their life in the environment of the world. Wolff 
sees this as the basic commission to establish civilisation: 15 . 
"It applies to all men, and it embraces every age. There 
is no human activity which is not covered by it. The man 
who found himself with his family on an unprotected plain 
exposed to ice cold wind and first laid a few stones, one 
upon another, and invented the wall, the basis of all 
architecture, was fulfilling this command. The woman who 
pierced a hole in a hard thorn or a fish bone and threaded 
a piece of animal sinew through it in order to be able to 
join together a few shreds of skin, and so invented the 
needle, sewing, the beginning of all art of clothing, was 
14. Charles Hauret, 1964, Beginnings. Genesis and Modern 
Science, (Westminister, Maryland: Christian Classics), p. 67 
15. Wolff, Anthropology, p. 164. 
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also fulfilling this command. 
human endeavour, comes under 
The whole of history, all 
this sign, this biblical 
phase. That is its objective aspect. But there is also a 
subjective side to it. It belongs inescapably to the 
nature of every man that he should come to terms with life. 
He must seek to come to terms inwardly with everything 
which he encounters, whether it be a speck of dust in his 
eye or a flood which threatens the life of himself and his 
family the nature of a man is recognisable from the 
way in which he comes to terms inwardly with things." 
And so the stewardship of human beings over creation has very 
definite parameters. The objective aspect of dominion is to 
establish firmly the destiny and survival of the human in the 







subjective aspect of dominion is 
morally this survival with the 




objective and the subjective sides of dominion is not kepS human 
beings threaten to undermine the very dominion in which they 
were established. Col 1: 15 sees Jesus Christ as the image of 
the invisible God and Paul in his letter to the Corinthians sees 
the necessity of putting on the new man (2 Co 3:10) All 
authority in heaven and on earth has been given to the exalted 
Christ (Mt 28: 18f). So in Christ, the One who was crucified, 
our stewardship over the world is saved from the self-
destructive tendency of sin and this image of God is once again 
allowed to emerge in all its creative freedom. 
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1.1.3.3 Interrelatedness 
We have already mentioned (1.1.3.1) how God's address 
establishes human beings in four fundamental relationships: to 
God, to animals, to each other and to the earth. The human 
beings responsibility and respondability is characterised in 
these four relationships. In the human beings' dominion over 
the animals and the earth the human being is called to both an 
objective and subjective stewardship as we have seen earlier 
(1.1.3.2). Scripture makes it clear that in order to fulfill 
these briefs the human being is established in community and it 
is the fundamental interrelatedness between man and woman and 
human beings in society that enables them also to encounter the 
gracious Lord of history as covenant partner and as guide. In 
Gn 2:21-25 we hear of the creation of woman from the side of 
Adam. Adam is put to sleep to emphasise the mysterious 
character of the work about to be accomplished ( cf Gn 15: 12; 
1 S 26:12; Is 29:10). We have already noted how the name of the 
man, Adam, recalls that of the earth (1.1.3.1). In the account 
of woman's creation her name ( 'ishah) is derived by popular 
etymology from the word for man ('ish), like our words, man and 
woman. This is a clear affirmation and unequivocal statement of 
the identity of nature and that it is the task of woman to 
complement man especially in the unity of "one flesh" (Gn 2:24). 
Hauret also points to the literary device at play in the 
creation of woman which emphasises her equality with man: 16 
"To each step in the creation of woman there corresponds a 
16. Hauret, Beginnings, p.83 
23 
picture: Yahweh reflects and deliberates ( 2: 18) . Yahweh 
organises a review of the animals by man (2:19-20). Yahweh 
takes a rib from man's side and builds it into a woman 
(2: 21-22). These three themes are connected with one 
another, the first preparing the second, which in turn is 
directed towards the third. All exegetes agree that the 
divine deliberation is a story-teller's touch and that this 
literary device is used to glorify the creation of woman." 
Despite the fact that in the institution of marriage under 
Judaic law a man was legally the "owner" of his wife (ba' al 
'issa; Ex 21:3; 2 S 11:26), and the wife was considered as her 
husband's "possession" (Gn 20:3, Dt 22:22), it is clear that a 
partner-like relationship between man and wife was possible in 
the Old Testament (cf Ho 2:16; Gn 2:23), and even occasionaly 
the union of man and woman is called berit (Ml 2:l4). Perhaps 
the clearest indication--- that a relationship of love generally 
existed between man and woman in the Old Testament is that some 
of the Prophets use this metaphor to describe the relationship 
between Yahweh and Israel (Ezk 16:8; Ho 2:3). This interrelated-
ness was also shown in the growing national awareness of the Old 
Testament as Wolff comments: 17 
"But the tribes of Israel knew that as Yahweh's people they 
were especially closely bound together, above all on the 
basis of their common salvation history and Yahweh's 
proclamation of his will (Josh., 24) 
While this understanding was not necessarily innovative in the 
ancient East, what is remarkable, is that there are many other 
17. Wolff, Anthropology, p. 187 
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strata of the Old Testament that draw our attention to the need 
for interrelatedness as a universal human phenomena (Gn 4:1-16; 
Lv 19:34), and what is truly innovative is that the Old 
Testament enjoins on the Israelite love of one•s enemy 
(Ex 23:4). For, just as in the Egyptian ritual of heaping coals 
on one•s head in atonement, a wise man who practises love of his 
enemy will bring him to remorse for the enmity and prepare him 
for reconciliation (Pr 25:21f). The Covenant Code abounds in 
prescriptions about attention to the poor and the lowly 
(Ex 22:20-26; 23:4-12), and the whole Prophetic tradition and 
Sapiential tradition also showed that it was impossible to 
please God without respecting other people (Am 1-2; Is 1:14-17; 
Jr 9:2-5; Ezk 18:5-9; Pr 14:21; Si 25:1; Ws 2:10ff) The 
nascent understanding of the equality of all people is also 
illustrated in Israel's critique of the law of slavery and the 
strong legal prescriptions forbidding abuse (Ex 21:20f; 
Dt 15:12-18; Lv 25:39f), as well as Israel's truly revolutionary 
view of the monarchy (Jg 9:8-15; Ps 72:2-4; Qo 10:5-7). The 
monarchy was eventually only reluctantly accepted as an 
institution in Israel, but the King • s prime responsibility was 
to defend the rights of the poor and needy and to be an example 
of religious integrity (2 S 12; Ps 72). What is somewhat 
nascent in the Old Testament becomes the central and unique 
thrust of the New Testament message. Throughout the New 
Testament the love of neighbour is inseparable from the love of 
God and the two commandments form the zenith and key of the Law 
(Mk 12:28-33). Love for all is the fulfillment of all moral 
demands (Ga 5:22); Rm 13:8f; Col 3:14f), the many sided work of 
all living faith (Ga 5:6; 1 Jn 4:20f). This love is not simply 
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philanthropy for it is based on the love of God itself 
(Mt 5:44f; Ep 5:1f), which is its source and the end to which it 
returns (Mt 25:40). The love of God in Christ continues to find 
expression through the acts of his disciples. This must be a 
universal love not knowing any social or racial barrier 
(Ga 3:28) , nor despising anyone, even enemies (Mt 5:43-47; 
Lk 1 0 : 2 9 - 3 7 ) . In marriage this love is expressed under the 
form of a total gift of each of the persons to each other after 
the image of the sacrifice of Christ (Ep 5:25-32), and in the 
church among Christians this love should take the form of a 
total communion in which each person takes part to the limit of 
his/her capacity for love and faith. 
as following: 18 
Claude Wiener sums this up 
"Such was the last prayer of Jesus: "that the love with 
which you loved me may be in them and I in them" 
(Jn 17:26). Left by the disciples in the midst of the world 
to which they do not belong (17:11.15f), this eternal love 
is the witness by which the world can recognise Jesus as 
sent by the Father (17:21): "by this all will know you as 
my disciples; by this love which you will have for one 
another" (13: 35)." 
1.1.3.4 Creature of Hope 
We have already mentioned that the earth is a pertinent reminder 
of the human mortality, set before them as the strange and 
inexorable boundary to life and so human beings are conscious of 
18.. Xavier Leon-Dufour, 1973, Dictionary of Biblical Theology, 
(New York: Seabury Press·), Love by Claude Weiner, p. 326 
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the fact that time is bestowed upon them as 11 Kairos 11 or 
opportunity. This opportunity is highlighted particularly in two 
ways in scripture. Firstly, there is a demythologizing of death 
and secondly, a progressive understanding that human life has 
meaning only when lived in hope. For the Israelite death 
happens to all living creatures and is not in any way unusual 
(Jos 23:14; 1 K 2:2) . Death is not surrounded in any kind of 
halo and in poetry is given a cynical title of honour 11 the king 
of terrors 11 (Jb 18:14) . Death contrasts by definition with 
life, as a person who has died can neither praise Yahweh's works 
nor Word (Ps 115:17; Is 38: 18f) . On the other hand, it is 
denied any independent power over and against that of Yahweh. 
In death, a dying person can discover both the limitations of 
all that is human and also the power of the promises of Yahweh 
(Dt 31: 1-6). In the Psalms the idea that Yahweh can snatch a 
·person away from death· ·already expresses an expectation of a 
bond with God that even physical death cannot interrupt 
(Ps 49:15; Ps 73:26). Yahweh prefers that the sinner should be 
converted and live (Ezk 18:33; 33:11) Once converted from 
his/her sin Yahweh will snatch the person from the infernal pit 
(Jb 33:19-30). As this seminal idea developed in the minds of 
the Israelites, they gradually carne to realise that in the last 
analysis any hope of deliverance from death will be vain unless 
this deliverance surpasses the bounds of terrestrial life. Life 
and its projects also only have purpose and meaning if their 
horizon extends beyond that of death (Ws 1:13; cf Qo 3; 
Si 10:10). The anguish of Job and the pessimism of Ecclesiastes 
bear witness to this fact, but, at a later date the Old 
Testament revelation did go further. It then hoped ·in the 
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ultimate triumph of God over death and a definitive deliverance 
of people when God sets up God's eschatological kingdom 
(Is 25:8). Then the just who sleep in dust will rise from their 
graves in order to participate in God's kingdom eternally while 
the wicked will remain in the eternal horror of Sheol (Dn 12:2; 
cf Is 26:19). Just as Enoch was saved from seeing death 
(Gn 5:24; cf Heb 11:4) the just will be raised by the Lord and 
taken into the Lord's glory (Ws 4: 7) . It is this hope that 
animated the martyrs in the time of the Maccabeus (2 M 7:9; cf 
14:46) and inspired Judas Maccabeus to inaugurate prayers for 
the dead (2M 12:43ff) Wolff has summed up the Old Testament 
hope as follows: 19 
"On the other hand, man, who is of his very nature 
orientated towards the future, can - trusting in the word 
of promise - remain radically hopeful within the relativity 
of 'a step at a time'. He neither reduces what is totally 
new to the trivial level of paltry innovations, nor does he 
burden men intolerably with what only the One who is 
incomparable can achieve. Only the man of confidence, as 
the hero of the promise, already experiences the foretaste 
of the new world. And it is a foretaste that he can 
extend to others." 
In the New Testament the dominant lines of prior revelation all 
converge on the mystery of Christ's death. In fact, all of 
human history appears like some gigantic drama of life and death 
until the coming of Christ. Without him there is only the 
kingdom of death but by his coming and through his death Christ 
triumphs over death itself. Through this, death takes on a new 
19. Wolff, Anthropology, p. 155 
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meaning for the renewed humanity which dies with Christ in order 
to live with him eternally. What gives force to the empire of 
death, which entered the world and human history through our sin 
(Rm 5:12; 1 Co 15: 21), is sin itself which is the "sting of 
death" (1 Co 15:56; cf Rm 6:16). Sin takes ,occasion from the 
Law to seduce us and more surely procure our death (Rm 7: 7-13) 
and the flesh, if it is not now animated by God's Spirit, 
fructifies itself in death (Rm 7:5, 8:6) . It is this tragic 
paradox of our condition that shows Christ's death not to be an 
accident. He foretold this to his disciples (Mk 8:31; Jn 12:33) 
and desired it like a baptism which would plunge him into the 
waters of hell (Lk 12:50; Mk 10:38); cf Ps 18:5). Since it was 
the Father's will (Mk 14:36), and Christ was obedient unto death 
(Ph 2:8), Christ went to death to fulfill the scriptures 
(Mt 26:54; cf Is 53:12). Having been born under the Law 
(Ga 4:4), and having taken on flesh like the flesh. of sin 
(Rm 8:3) , Christ was united with all his people and the entire 
human race. The punishment merited by the sin of humankind fell 
on him and so he took on to the very end the lot of sinners. 
Tasting death as they all must do (Heb 2:8f; cf 1 Th 4:14; 
Rm 8: 34) Christ brought them the good news that life would be 
restored to them (1 P 3:19; 4:6). Christ, therefore, freed them 
from the law of sin and death to which all had previously been 
slaves (Rm 8:2; cf Heb 2:15). This triumph will have a dazzling 
consummation in the general resurrection when death will be 
destroyed forever, "swallowed up in victory" ( 1 Co 15:26, 54ff) . 
Until that final victory each Christian is dead and his/her life 
is hidden with Christ in God (Col 3:3). This is the meaning of 
baptism whose· sacramental efficacy unites us to the death of 
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Christ: (Rm 6:3 ff; Ph 3:10) We die t:o t:hat: ent:ire order of 
t:hings by which t:he rule of deat:h manifest:s it:self on this 
earth: we die t:o sin (Rm 6:11), to the flesh (1 P 3:18), to the 
body or the old man (Rm 6:6), to the Law (Ga 2:19), and to all 
the elements of t:he unredeemed world (Col 2: 2 0) . This dying 
realised sacramentally in bapt:ism, must: be cont:inually 
actualised each day of our lives (Rm 6: 1-4). Each Christ:ian 
11 dies for the Lord 11 (Rm 14:7f), in the hope that 11 He who raised 
Christ Jesus from t:he dead will also give your mortal bodies 
1 if e 11 ( Rm 8 : 11 ) . This is why dying for the Christian is in the 
final analysis gain because Christ is a Christ:ian's life 
(Ph 1:21) and each Christian would prefer t:o leave t:his life in 
order to be with the Lord (2 Co 5:8) The Christian is anxious 
to put on the clothing of glory so that whatever is mortal in 
them might be absorbed by Life (2 Co 5:1-4; cf 1 Co 15:51-53; 
Ph 1:23). 
1.2; Anthropology in Catholic Dogmatic Tradition 
Origen, the great African church father, had advanced as a 
hypot:hesis for theological thinking that souls pre-existed their 
concept:ion and birt:h and were inserted int:o t:he body as a 
punishment for sin. (De Principiis 3,3,5) The body was, 
t:herefore, seen as a degrading place of exile and t:he idea t:hat: 
sin could be commit:ted before the union with the body dissolved 
the unity which const:itutes a human person. A group of monks in 
Jerusalem exaggerated and proposed this teaching as firm 
doct:rine and so it was condemned at the provincial Council of 
Const:ant:inople (543 A.D). · This condemnation was lat:er confirmed 
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by Pope Vigil ius. Priscillian was the founder of a Manichaean 
sect in Spain: teaching that the devil was the evil principle 
and the creator of matter and the human body whereas the soul 
was divine by nature and was united to the body in punishment 
for previous sins. The canons of the Council of Braga (561 
A.D.) in Portugal reject this radical dualism of matter and 
spirit together with the implied contempt for the human body. 
It upholds that all that exists is good by nature because it is 
made by God. Human marriage and the procreation of children 
and, indeed, the creation of all flesh is good. A similar 
teaching held by the Albigensians and Waldensians in France and 
the Lombards in Italy was condemned by Pope Innocent III, who in 
a profession of faith rejected dualism in its various aspects 
insisting on the creation of all things by God who is the author 
of the Old Testament as well as the New. This teaching was 
ratified at the Fourth Lateran General Council (1215 A.D.). At 
the General Council of Vienna (1311-1312 A.D.), it was affirmed 
that the spiritual "soul" is by itself also the principle of 
organic life: 20 
II We define that from now on, whoever presumes to 
assert, defend, or obstinately hold that the rational and 
intellectual soul is not of itself and essentially the form 
of the human body, is to be censored as heretic." 
The spiritualistic movements of the time attempted to separate 
the spirit from the realities of nature and history and so to 
split human nature into two heterogeneous spheres. The Council 
20. J.Neuner and J.Dupuis, editors, 1976, The Christian Faith in 
the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church, (Dublin: Mercier 
Press) , n 405 
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against this upheld the unity of human nature in all its 
spheres. The Fifth Lateran General Council (19 .12 .1513) 1 
proclaimed the unity, individuality and immortality of the human 
person. Pietro Pomponazzi, a professor in Padua (1464-1525 
A.D.), under the influence of Aristotelean philosophy, had 
taught that the spiritual "soul" of a person is not an 
individual entity but is common to all. At death it loses its 
individual identity and merges with the universal spirit. 
Against this the Council asserted: 21 
"The intellectual soul is not only truly, of itself and 
essentially, the form of the human body, but it is also 
immortal and, according to the number of bodies into which 
it is infused, it can be, has been and will be multiplied 
in individuals." 
At the time of the Reformation, Luther taught that original sin 
consists in concupiscence which remains in the person after 
baptism but which, because of Christ's justice, is no longer 
imputed to the sinner. At the Council of Trent (1547 A.D.), 
attention was also given to the Pelagain errors of the early 
church as well as to those of the Manichaeans and 
Prischillianists: 22 
"If anyone asserts that this sin of Adam, which is one in 
origin and is transmitted by propagation, not by imitation, 
and which is in all men, proper to each; can be taken away 
by the powers of human nature or by any remedy other than 
the merits of the one mediator our Lord Jesus Christ who 
reconciled us with God by His blood, being "made our 
21. Ibid., p. 118 
22. Ibid., pp.l30-132 
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righteousness and sanctification and redemption" ( 1 Cor 
1:30), anathema sit. 
If anyone denies that the guilt of original sin is 
remitted by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ given in 
baptism, or asserts that all that this sin in the true and 
proper sense is not taken away but only brushed over or not 
imputed, anathema sit. 
The holy Council, however, thinks and professes that 
concupiscence or the inclination to sin remains in the 
baptised. Since it is left for us to wrestle with, it 
cannot harm those who do not consent but manfully resist it 
by the grace of 
lawfully will 
Jesus Christ. 
be crowned (cf 
Rather, one 
2 Tim 2: 5). 
who strives 
Of this 
concupiscence which the apostle occasionally called sin (cf 
Rom 6:12ff; 7:7,14-20), the holy Council declares: The 
Catholic Church has never understood that it is called sin 
because it would be sin in the true and proper sense in 
those who have been reborn, but because it comes from sin 
and inclines to sin. 
anathema sit". 
If anyone thinks the contrary, 
At the First Vatican General Council (1870 A.D.), the Council 
Fathers addressed 1n particular the errors of materialism and 
pantheism. The fundamental premise of the former was that only 
matter exists1 while the latter identified in one or another way 
the world with God. Canons 417 and 418 confess that: 23 
"God is the universal or indefinite being which, by self-
determination, constitutes the universality of beings 
23. Ibid., p. 120 
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differentiated into general, species and individuals 
the world and all things contained in it, the spiritual as 
well as material, were in their whole substance produced by 
God out of nothing;" 
In his encyclical letter: Humani Generis (1950 A.D.), Pius XII 
addressed many of the same issues. Regarding humankind's origin 
through evolution from other living beings, as we have seen in 
the introduction, Pius XII left the question open to scholarly 
investigation supposing that the creation of the soul by God 
would be maintained. The question whether the human race should 
be considered as descending from a single couple or can be 
considered to originate from several couples (monogenism or 
polygenism) is not completely settled for the Pope says: 24 
"It is not at all apparent how such a view (polygenism) can 
be reconciled with the data which the sources of revealed 
truth and the documents of the Church propose concerning 
original sin, namely, that it originates from a sin truly 
committed by one Adam, is transmitted to all through 
generation and is in each, proper to him". 
At the second Vatican General Council many of the traditional 
doctrines about creation and human nature are taken for granted 
and reasserted only in passing. What becomes the focus is 
establishing the human being in a broader base of existence. In 
the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World 
(Gaudium et Spes, 7 December 1965), the Council Fathers 
reasserted that human beings made up of both a material and 
spiritual component are the crown of creation (G.S. 14) for they 
are created in God's likeness (G.S. 12,17,29,34) 
24. Ibid., p. 121 
Human beings, 
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therefore, have a unique dignity (G. S. 40,46, 63) : this means 
that all people are equal (G.S. 29) sharing a common origin and 
a common destiny. This latter idea is particularly developed in 
another document of the Council, Nostra Aetate (1965) : 25 
"All men form but one community. This is so because all 
stem from the one stock which God created to people the 
entire earth (cf Acts 17:26), and also because all share a 
common destiny, namely God. His providence, evident 
goodness, and saving designs extend to all men (cf Wis 8:1; 
Acts 14: 17; Rom 2: 6-7; 1 Tim 2:4) . Against the day when 
the elect are gathered together in the holy city which is 
illumined by the glory of God, and in whose splendour all 
peoples will walk (cf Apoc 21:23ff) ." 
The human being by his/her very nature is also social 
(G. S. 23, 24, 32) , and one's personal and social life unfolds in 
the life of the family, in culture, in the socio-economic life, 
in the political life and in the family of nations (G.S. 47-90). 
The social nature of humans is summed up as follows: 26 
" ... there is a certain parallel between the union existing 
among the divine persons and the union of the sons of God 
in truth and love. It follows, then, that if man is the 
only creature on earth that God has wanted for its own 
sake, man can fully discover his true self only in a 
sincere giving of himself." 
But, this giving of oneself is not restricted to the social or 
political sphere, it includes also the work of human beings, for 
25. Austin Flannery, O.P. 1975, general editor, Vatican II: The 
-=C=o::..::nc.=..c=i-=lo...:i:...:a~r=------=a=n=d'----'P=--o==s'-"t:;__-=C-=o"'-n:...:c=l=-· l=-=i=a=r=----=Dc...:o=-..:c:::..u==-m=e~n.::..;t:::..s= , (Dub l in : Dominic an 
Publications), p. 738 
26. Ibid., p.925 
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through their work, if it is directed towards God, human beings 
extend their mastery over nature, they grow in God's image and 
they further the coming of God's kingdom: 27 
"Human activity proceeds from man: it is also ordered to 
. him. When he works, not only does he transform matter and 
society, but he fulfills himself. He learns, he develops 
his faculties, and he emerges from and transcends himself. 
Rightly understood, this kind of growth is more precious 
than any kind of wealth that can be amassed. It is what a 
man is, rather than what he has, that counts. Technical 
progress is of less value than advances towards greater 
justice, wider brotherhood, and a more humane social 
environment. Technical progress may supply the material 
for human advance but it is powerless to actualise it." 
Pope Paul VI, in his encyclical: Populorum Progressio (1967 
A.D.), continued the Catholic tradition of seeing the dignity of 
each person as rising from the fact of being created in the 
The Pope placed great emphasis on full personal 
development. Genuine growth must cover all dimensions of the 
person and so1 human development can only be realised in a 
society 1n which the institutional structures respect human 
dignity and regard it as an end in itself. These thoughts were 
given special impetus at the meeting of the Latin American 
Bishops' Conference held at Medellin (1968 A.D) and Puebla (1979 
A.D.). The Conference stressed: 28 
"However, authentic and permanent attainment of human 
dignity on the second level (social and interpersonal) 
27. Ibid. I p. 934 
28. Puebla: 1980, Evangelization at Present and in the Future of 
Latin America, (Middlegreen: St Paul Publications), p. 83 
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would not be possible unless we were at the same time 
authentically free to find self-realisation on a 
transcendent level. This is the plane of the Absolute 
Good, where our freedom is always at stake even when we 
seem to be unaware of it . It involves an inescapable 
confrontation with the divine mystery of Someone." 
Since we are created by God in God's image we can come to know 
our dignity by understanding what is most human in people, i.e., 
the natural ability to reflect upon oneself and come to self-
knowledge and fulfillment. Pope John Paul II in two encyclicals: 
Laborem Exercens (1981 A.D.) and Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987 
A.D.), has summed up the fundamental precepts of salvation 
history regarding the human person: since people are created in 
the image and likeness of God, they have a fundamental dignity. 
By the Incarnation Christ has restored us to that dignity (Ep 
2: 22ff), this liberation from sin and its consequences include 
the structural dimensions of society (Ga 4:4-3), since justice 
attains its fullness in love (Jn 13: 34) . We can say that the 
kingdom of God is already present in a hidden form, but will 
only come in its fullness at the end of time, a fundamental hope 
towards which all are called. It is that hope that motivates 
development of the human person in all their aspects. 
John Paul II sums up: 29 
As Pope 
"For believers in God it follows that development today may 
be seen as part of the continuing story of humanity which 
started at creation and is constantly threatened by 
infidelity and temptation to idolatry. Anyone who wants to 
29. Pope John Paul II, 1989, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, (London: 
Catholic Truth Society), pp. 28-29 
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give up on the struggle to improve the human situation and 
condition in all their aspects, either because the task is 
too difficult, or because a sustained effort is required, 
or because of failures and the need for fresh beginnings, 
is betraying the Will of God The efforts we make, 
individually and with others, to improve the human 
condition and to overcome the difficulties we encounter in 
the struggle, are a part of this divine plan which begins 
from eternity in Christ, \the perfect image of the Father, 
and culminates in him 'the first-born of the dead'." 
1.3. Systematic Reflection 
From our survey of the Judaic/Christian anthropology, it is 
evident that the concept which most characterizes the human 
being, and which is most frequently used, is that he/she is in 
the image of God. At the Council of Florence, in its Decree for 
the Jacobites, the Council Fathers adopted a formula of Anselm 
of Canterbury in describing the nature of God:30 
"Everything (in God) is one where there is no opposition 
of relationship". 
From this definition it is clear that in God there is a 
plurality, only where there are relations of opposition. It is 
these relations therefore, that distinguish Persons one from 
another. Theology has rightly concluded from this that the 
divine Persons are therefore constituted by relation or 'esse 
ad' and define these as subsistent relations .. If human beings 
30. J. Neuner and J. Dupuis, 
in the Doctrinal Documents 
Mercier Press), n 325 
editors, 1976, The Christian Faith 
of the Catholic Church, (Dublin: 
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are most characteristically in the image of God, ( cf pp. 18-19; 
pp. 33-34), then, what enables them to be distinct personal 
beings (p. 34), unique from other people, with whom they share a 
common human nature, is their particular relation to God, others 
and creation at large. In short, the human beings' 
relationality is what establishes the uniqueness of each person. 
The essence of any image consists in the fact that it represents 
something else: it is not merely what it itself is, but it goes 




to be in the image of GodJ of necessity implies a dynamic 
sets the human in motion towards the totally Other (cf 
35-36) In this regard, Galot observes: 31 
"Human persons not only have personality, they are also 
subject to growth in personality. A human person gradually 
becomes more of a person as the reality of his person 
develops. This maturation is provided by the activation of 
his relational dynamism. In relating to others, the person 
becomes more profoundly himself." 
This is also why we can only discover our true self in a sincere 
giving of ourselves (cf p. 34). 
This relationality is established by God's Word (cf p. 17): in 
creating and choosing the human for a special relationship, God 
liberates the human to be the creature that reflects God's 
nature. In our Introduction we maintained that Pius XII's 
insistence that God creates the "soul" immediately, while 
leaving the evolution of the body from other living beings an 
open.question, means in essence that he is asserting that the 
31. Ibid., p. 290 
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11 how 11 of God's creation of human beings is open to 
investigation, but not the 11 why 11 • God creates each 11 Soul 11 
because God wills the human person as an end in itself, and 
God's 11 saving designs extends to all men 11 ( cf p. 34) . This 
necessarily implies two things: firstly, that God is ultimately 
responsible for the physical dynamics that brings forth human 
life, and, secondly, that God sets God's own self up as the 
horizon which enables humankind generally and individually to 
realise its personhood. 
what the church's tradition has This personhood is, we believe, 
called our 'soul': that unique, immortal unity that 
characterises each human person. We all share a common human 
nature, but the particular way in which each person appropriates 
this nature and develops its relational capabilities is what 
characterises the person in his/her essence. This is why the 
church has insisted on the 'soul' being the form or essence of 
the person (cf pp. 30-31) and why it has consistently sought to 
defend the unity of body and 'soul' . The person's spiritual 
destiny cannot be divorced from his/her concrete human life and 
it is within the whole person that the created world reaches its 
fulfillment in God (cf p. 35, 37). This personal essence is 
immortal, for while the new life granted to all after death lS 
not merely a higher state of existence (as animal over plant), 
but a new life issuing from God's sovereign power (2 Co 5:1-10; 
cf also pp. 27-29), how one has lived this present life, will 
determine how one is able to appropriate the ultimate relational 
possibility of an unfettered life in Christ, with God. This 
immortality shows itself firstly in the very nature of human 
consciousness. Since humans are capable of envisaging the 
original unity of 
possibility must 
Secondly, because 
being within each 
be constitutive of 
humans are the only 
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act of freedom, this 
their very personhood. 
creatures that God has 
wanted for "their own sake'' (cf p.34), from the very covenant of 
creatio~ our immortality can be assumed. A perusal of the Old 
Testament evidence makes it clear that t~e phrase: heqim berit 
(to erect a covenant), is generally used to describe the 
perpetuation of an old covenant ( cf Gn 6: 18, 9: 9, 11, 17, 19, 21; 
Ex 6 : 4 ; Lv 2 6 : 9 ; Dt 8: 18) . 
between Gn 9:1-2 and Gn 1:28, 
Given this and 




there is an 
intended correspondence between Noah and Adam and that in Noah 
and the other subsequent covenants, God renews his original 
creative intent for humankind. We have already noted the 
development of the idea of immortality in the scriptures (cf pp. 
26-29) and how the mystery of death converges on the death of 
Christ, which makes it clear that Christ who realises the 
deepest hopes and expectations of redemption, renews forever 
God's intentions to clothe whatever is mortal in life (cf p.29). 
In the final chapter we will examine in greater detail how God 
sets God's self as the horizon to human life. From this chapter 
it is clear that God does this firstly by setting humankind, "as 
the dust that thinks" (cf p. 20), in dominion over creation. In 
our stewardship (both external and internal) therefore, God 
elicits our initial relational capacity and the nature of our 
freedom. We have seen from modern church teaching particularly 
( cf pp. 34-3 7) , that our stewardship of creation means that 
while we are to secure our survival (external), this must not be 
at the cost of our moral or spiritual freedom (internal). Human 
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activity must be ordered towards furthering the integral 
development of the human person ( cf p. 35) , and, while one's 
personal life naturally unfolds in the life of the family, in 
culture, and in the socio-economic and political sphere, human 
freedom and dignity must be the norm for judging these 
institutions. Secondly, in the very dynamic within ourselves 
between 'flesh' and 'spirit', between life and death, we realise 
that our personhood and its relational projects only have 
meaning and purpose, if their horizon extends beyond death to 
the life of God (cf p. 27). Thirdly, it is in our communion 
with God and other people that our relational potential is most 
extended. This communion is the fulfillment of freedom ( cf 
p.24) and although it means putting to death the 'flesh' and 
putting on the 'new Man' (cf p. 28), it also is the prime means 
by which we are progressively freed by the Spirit of life (cf 
pp. 13-14) 0 
We have mentioned that we share with all other humans a common 
human nature and in biblical theology we have seen that this is 
characterised by the terms: 'soul', 'flesh', 'spirit', and 
'heart' (cf pp. 4-17) These express the human person in 
his/her different aspects or, as we have called them, his/her 
relational capacities. So, for example, 'soul' can be most 
commonly understood as the principle of life that God's Spirit 
grants to all living beings; 'flesh' is usually used to 
designate the creaturehood of all life; 'spirit' is most 
· generally the enlivening and authorising efficacy of God, which 
determines the strength and freedom of the 'heart' and the 
openness of the 'soul' to God. 'Heart' is · the centre of the 
consciously living person, where rational functions occur as 
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well as decisions of the will. So while biblical theology 
primarily sees the person in his/her relation to God (cf p. 4), 
it is a valid development of tradition to view a human person as 
a unity of a spiritual and a physical aspect (cf p. 30). 
Scripture does implicitly acknowledge a spiritual aspect ('soul' 
and 'heart') as well as a physical aspect ('flesh' and 'body') 
as in Greek philosophy, while the emphasis is not on two 
different components, but rather on different aspects of the one 
integrated personality. Through the 'flesh' and 'body' one is 
related to the terrestial world (cf p.8), and through the 'soul' 
and 'heart' one is related to the celestial world. Only when 
the 'flesh' is adopted as the exclusive norm of existence does 
the personality experience a complete disintegration. It is 
God's Spirit that enables one to avoid this disintegration, and, 
despite the weakness introduced by original sin (cf p. 13,32; we 
discuss this further at the end of chapter 2) , it enables the 
person to develop his/her relational capacities so as to reach a 
coherent maturity and fulfillment in Christ. 
Chapter 2 




We have already noted that to the extent that the scriptural and 
dogmatic explication of the person's understanding of his/her 
self has been inspired by the Holy Spirit, to that extent can it 
claim to be foremost-jn bringing us to an experiential knowledge 
of our proper nature (cf p. 4). However, revelation is God's 
Word addressed to the human being and so it necessarily speaks 
of God in relation to the human being and the world. Revelation 
can, therefore, only be fully understood, proclaimed and lived 
through an encounter with the world. The world is not a vacuum 
into which God's Word can flow without resistance. Frequently 
the conceptions of society have a positive inner relationship to 
that of the Word (cf pp. 33-37); but there will also be tension 
and antagonism between the two. We have seen how much of the 
dogmatic tradition has developed as a polemic in response to 
this (cf pp. 29-33) 
Anthropology is our explanation of ourselves. Etymologically 
it means "the study of mankind" . (logqs· anp anthropos) . But what 
makes it unique is that in this science the questioner and the 
questioned are one and the same. This means that our answers to 
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the questions of anthropology are always inadequate. Indeed, if 
we could answer all the questions about ourselves we would at 
that moment cease to be human for our freedom would then be 
circumscribed within the tidy parameters of logic. Friedrich 
Nietzsche, the famous German Philosopher, characterised human 
beings as the 11 undetermined animal 11 • We look back in history at 
the way in which we have used our freedom drawing inferences 
about who we really are, about our motives and actions, but 
since history is not yet finished, 
ourselves is always tentative and 
the understanding we have of 
subject to revision. That 
history is also multifaceted so our understanding of ourselves 
is. possible only if we reflect the variety of approaches that 
characterise our history. In this chapter we look briefly at 
some of these approaches to the human person so as to continue 
the dialogue between the Word and the world into which it must 
flow. 
2.2. Philosophical-Views of the Human -Berson 
2. 2 .1. -Classical Rationalism 
The classical rationalistic view of the human person was 
inherited mainly from Greece and Rome and was revived in a 
slightly different form during the Renaissance. What 
characterises the human person according to this approach is 
that human beings are rational beings. For Plato reason is the 
highest part of the soul independent and immortal 1n its 
essential nature. This is because reason is · able to penetrate 
the very nature of things. The same thought is echoed by 
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Aristotle who saw reason as the highest faculty of the human 
soul, setting people apart from sub-human nature. Since the mind 
is the unifying principle of the human person, and as such is 
distinguished from the body, it follows that an intelligent 
person is also a virtuous person: to know the right is to do it 
and vice is the result of ignorance. This optimistic confidence 
in the human 1 s reason is echoed in the Rennaisance view of 
people. While the Rennaisance understood the uniqueness of 
human beings both in terms of their rational independence and 
their relationship to God, the relationship to God found its 
emphasis in free enquiry and choices. While the classical view 
of a human person. therefore, was essentially optimistic, there 
was also an undertone of melancholy and realism in Graeco-Roman 
civilisation: impressed by the brevity and mortality of the 
human person and also by the fact of evident corruption, some of 
the ·Greek thinkers, such as Democri tus · and Epicurus-, stressed 
that many could not be among the wise and while not denying the 
importance of reason interpreted it in a more naturalistic and 
mechanical sense. Perhaps the greatest spokesman for 
rationalism in the modern period was I Rene Descartes (d. 1650 
A.D.) , who saw in the human 1 s capacity to reason not only the 
foundation of all knowledge, but also the very foundation of 
existence itself (cogito ergo sum; I think, therefore, I am). 
To deny this I according to Descartes I is to confirm it I for 
doubt itself is thought and, because thinking is a fact, there 
must always be a thinker. For Descartes the mind and body 
express the· two fundamentally different substances of nature, 
namely, thought and extension. The body and the mind followed 
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essentially different laws, the body being part of the material 
mechanical world whereas the mind was part of the free spiritual 
world, of thought, the two only having some spurious interaction 
in the pineal gland of the person. 
2.2.2. Existentialism 
The latent melancholy and realism of Graeco-Roman culture 
surfaced again at the beginning of the industrial revolution in 
the writings of a Danish Lutheran, Soren Kierkegaard 
(d. 1855 A.D.), who is considered to be the father of modern 
existentialist thought. The industrial revolution had brought 
in its wake tremendous social upheavals, exploitation of human 
labour and its conconunitant disillusionment. For Kierkegaard 
our individuality only really surfaces with an awareness-of our 
own limitations and our impending death. It is this awareness 
that puts us in relationship and awareness with the Absolute. 
Friedrich Nietzsche (d. 1900 A.D), emphasised the fact that 
meaning in life is not .something objective waiting to be 
perceived and appropriated, rather it is something we have to 
create for ourselves. It is in this process of creation that 
men and women realise their real nature through the struggle of 
various groups in value-creating acts. This idea that the true 
essence of human life only emerges through existence and with 
the struggle for existenc~ is echoed in the writings of the two 
most famous French existentialists, Jean Paul Sartre (d. 1980 
A.D.) and Albert Camus (d. 1960 A.D.) Their most famous dictum 
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is: existence precedes essence, which is explained by Titus as 
follows: 1 
"Sartre follows Nietzche in denying the existence of God 
and elaborating on the implications of this view, which 
includes seeing man as lacking a formed or given nature. 
He has to make himself and to choose the conditions under 
which he has to live. Thus, "there is no human nature, 
because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man 
simply is. Not that he is simply what he conceives himself 
to be, but he is what he wills, and as he conceives himself 
after already existing - as he wills to be after the leap 
towards existence. Sartre denies man any external support; 
he must rely on his own resources and be held totally 
responsible for his free choices." 
For Martin Heidegger (d. 1976 A.D.), in his famous manual: Being 
and Time (1927), if-- we are to come to an understanding of what 
it means to be human, we must reflect on what it is that we are 
and do. If we do this we discover that selfhood is not ready-
made but rather is always on the way and always incomplete at 
any given moment. If we analyse this incompleteness we discover 
certain tensions or polarities in human existence: first there 
is a tension between freedom and finitude, then between 
rationality and irrationality, third the polarity between 
responsibility and impotence, then between anxiety and hop~ and 
finally, between the individual and society. To be able to live 
authentically within these tensions a person must recognise that 
death sets the ultimate framework of our human existence, for it 
1. Harold H. Titus, 1979, Living Issues in Philosopy, (New York: 
D. van Nostrand), p. 337 
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is death that compels us to bring all our possibilities into 
some kind of over-arching unity, introducing a wholeness and 
unity to life. In fact, Heidegger defines the human person as 




Heidegger's anthropology provides a bridge between 
existentialist thought and phenomenology: existentialism being 
primarily concerned with the human person as a source of freedom 
and spontaneous activity, whereas Phenomenology is concerned 
primarily with a person as a knower or subject of conscious 
thought. Edmund Husserl (d. 1938 A.D.), was the founder of 
modern Phenomenology. Consciousness for Husserl is unique in 
creation for, unlike the material universe., it is not materially 
explainable, but has structure and rules - proper to itself. 
Consciousness is never closed in upon itself.· however, for it 
has an intentionality; that is, it is always conscious of 
something, 
follows: 2 
of phenomena. Richard McBrien explains it as 
"Phenomenology studies such phenomena, not as things 1n 
themselves (as other scientists do) but as objects of 
intentionality. But it does not revert to psychologism 
because phenomenology maintains that there is a fundamental 
and irreducible duality between consciousness and the 
world. The two are correlated as the eye is correlated 
with the field of vision." 
2. Richard P. McBrien, 1984, Cathol~cism, 
Chapman), p. 118 (London: Geoffrey 
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Material objects, like a stone, can pass through innumerable 
events and not be changed by them but human persons are changed 
by what happens to them and our past experiences enter into our 
present consciousness and personality. But we are not, on the 
other hand, imprisoned by the past because the present is always 
open to the future. This openness to the future and 
consciousness of the past
1 
that characterises the human being) is 
what enables the human person to engage in a process of enquiry 
into who and what they really are. 
2.3. /Social Views. of -the Person 
2.3.1. Early---Thinkers 
Consideration of the human person in their social context is a 
consideration as old as the human race. In the writings of 
Plato and Aristotle we already have a systematic development of 
the idea of the human person as a social being. For Plato, the 
ideal social arrangement should reflect the nature of the human 
person. Since the human person was divided into a rational 
element, a spirited element and an appetitive element, the ideal 
society would comprise of three classes reflecting these 
elements. The ruling class would be the rational element of 
society, the soldiers or army its spirited element, the other 
citizens would be its appetitive element. Like the ideal 
individual the ideal society would be one in which these three 
elements functioned harmoniously. It was largely these ideas 
that dominated the social vision of people through the Middle 
Ages although there were significant developments among certain 
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theologians in developing the idea of the 'ius gentium'. This 
envisages a moral order which goes beyond the strictly juridical 
sphere. With the free enquiry encouraged with the Rennaisance, 
philosophers became aware that many views of human society had 
been trapped by these earlier classical and religious images of 
the human person. Thomas Hobbes (d. 1679 A.D.), argued that 
human beings were naturally competitive, aggressive, and anti-
social. The natural condition of human people before the advent 
of society was, therefore, characterised by Hobbes as 'a war of 
all against all' . Because of this state and human being's 
natural drive to selfishly protect their own interests, human 
beings entered into a social contract with each other to secure 
peace and ceded all authority to the monarchy. Jean Jacques 
Rousseau (d .. 1778 A.D.), envisaged the human person as naturally 
good and held that it was society that had corrupted the person. 
John Locke (d. 1704 A.D.) , often called the father of modern 
democracy, held a position midway between these two extremes. 
Human persons in their natural state lived fundamentally in 
peac~ but because there were always those who transgressed and 
endangered that peace, societies arose as a means by which to 
apply punishment to those who transgressed the law. Society, 
therefore, originates in the attempt to develop institutionally 
for the purpose of remedying the natural defects of life without 
organised society. People create society by voluntary agreement 
among themselves and so1 leaders do not have absolute authority, 
but their authority extends to the degree that they are mandated 
by the people. In the writings of the German Philosopher, 
George Wilhelm Hegel (d. 1831 A.D.), we find the individual and 
society united in the notion that both are moments in the life 
~ . j 
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of the Absolute. Being or the Absolute (God) is in a dialetical 
process of becoming. The Absolute in itself goes over naturally 
into the universe or nature which is the Absolute for itself and 
in the human consciousness the Absolute comes to think itself 
for the human consciousness is the Absolute in and for itself. 
History represents the gradual and continuous unfolding of the 
Absolute and since society or the state is the human being's 
highest expression of his/her nature, we see at any historical 
moment in the state the highest expression of the Absolute. 
Stumpf3 sums up this idea as follows: 
"A particular individual, he said, is conscious of himself 
in so far he is a part of this larger self. And, says 
Hegel, since the state is mind objectified, it is only as 
one of its members that the individual himself has 
objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life." 
2.3.2. Social Scientists 
In many ways sociology is an intellectual response to the 
peculiar crisis of modern western society and arose in the 19th 
and 20th centuries amidst the uncertainty caused by large-scale 
industrialisation and urbanisation. It was also a protest 
against the excessive rationalism of the Enlightenment and the 
individualism of the Romantic Era. The early fathers of 
sociology such as Auguste Comte (d. 1857 A.D.), Herbert Spencer 
(d. 1903A.D.), and Emile Durkheim (d. 1917A.D.), all shared 
the optimismJthat in order to cure the apparent social ills of 
3. Samuel E. Stumpf, 1988, Socrates to Sartre, 
Philosophy, (New York: Mc-Graw Hill), p.336 




it was necessary that human beings undertake a 
scientific study of their life in society. Modern sociology 
shares their basic assumption: that in order to understand the 
human person one has also to understand the dynamics that 
constitute that person in their social grouping. 
The Social Learning theories can be traced back to the writings 
of B. F. Skinner, who held that human behaviour is shaped and 
maintained by its consequences. The more rewarding people find 
the results of an actio~ the more likely this action is to be 
repeated. Society, therefore, is a system of interacting humans 
who reciprocally reinforce one another's behaviour in ways that 
produce actions which the group find acceptable. The most 
famous proponent of Symbolic Interactionism was George Herbert 
Mead (d. 1931 A.D.). For Mead, what is distinctive about human 
social behaviour and distinguishes it from that of lower 
animals, is·· the extent to which human interaction is mediated by 
symbols. Mind, for Mead, is a social process in which 
significant symbols call out in the person who presents them,the 
same response that they call out in the person to whom they are 
presented. Within each individual there is the social self 
which is constituted by the sum total of socially significant 
symbols that has been internalised by the person during his/her 
socialisation or introduction into a particular society. On the 
other hand, there is also in each person a creative aspect. 
Symbols are not static and each person brings to the shared 
symbolic universe of society new definitions and interpretations 
which, if accepted by others, add to the growing sediment of 
culture within each society. Peter Berger calls this sediment 
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the symbolic universe of society and shows how a particular 
language is a human person's most powerful symbol: 4 
"In principle, any sign system would do. Normally, of 
course, the decisive sign system is linguistic. Language 
objectivates the shared experiences and makes them 
available to all within the linguistic community, thus 
becoming both the basis and the instrument of the 
collective stock of knowledge. Furthermore, language 
provides the means for objectifying new experiences, 
allowing the incorporation into the already existing stock 
of knowledge, and it is the most important means by which 
the objectivated and objectified sedimentations are 
transmitted in the tradition of the collectivity in 
question." 
Structural Functionalism presumes that for societies to operate 
as systems some balance or equilibrium must be maintained among 
the various parts. So any phenomenon of society can be 
explained on the basis of its consequences. Particular 
structures or ways of behaviour arise and are maintained because 
of the consequences they have. Not that there is only one way 
to fulfill necessary social functions, for example there would 
be more than one way in which to rear children, but the very 
persistence of one form of social relation gives us insight into 
the nature of a particular society and the human beings that 
comprise it. The Conflict Theories derive largely from the work 
of the great 19th century social philosopher, Karl Marx (d. 1883 
A.D.) For Karl Marx society is fundamentally the human 
4. Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann, 1979, The Social Construction 
of Reality, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books), pp. 85-86 
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adaptation to nature and so what forms the basis of all social 
arrangements is in the end an analysis of economic forces. 
Throughout the history of human beings these economic forces are 
characterised by some form of economic organisation, what Karl 
Marx calls relations of production. These, in turn, reflect the 
forces of production or the level of technology of that society. 
In the industrial stage the bourgeoisie are in charge of both 
the relations and forces of production and the proletariat or 
workers are at their mercy. Karl Marx, therefore, sees the 
present condition of human beings both in terms of social 
alienation, that is, that human beings are split into these two 
groups of people (bourgeoisie and proletariat) and also in terms 
of economic alienation. The working-class person suffers 
economic alienation firstly, with regard to the product of 
his/her activity, since it is entirely out of the person's 
control (as soon as it is created the worker is dispossessed of 
it); and secondly, the worker not only loses his/her product, 
but this product stands over and against him/her as a hostile 
power. As it is transformed into capital, it becomes the 
instrument of his/her exploitation. The product in which labour 
becomes objectified turns into the object that crushes the 
labourer. Since by one's labour a person becomes 
entirety, a person's labour 
co-extensive 
is his/her with nature in its 
primary activity. 
longer able to 
Being alienated from nature the worker is no 
realise him/herself as a human being. The 
bourgeoisie also suffer these two forms of alienation since the 
bourgeoisie merely gathers the fruits of another's labour. 
Without sharing in the mediating character of labour the 
bourgeoisie loses the meaning of primary human activity. 
55 
Further, the bourgeoisie are alienated from their fellow human 
beings, especially the workers whom the bourgeoisie treat as 
objects to be exploited for gain. It is only in the classless 
Utopia that human beings will once again be truly in touch with 
each other and with nature through their primary activity of 
labour. Conflict Theorists, therefore, do agree with the 
Structural Functionalists that for something to exist in 
society, it must serve a function1 but they would ask, functional 
for whom, and would contend that particular social arrangements 
serve particular groups within societies at the expense of other 
groups. A particular social arrangement exists to serve the 
interests of those groups that have the most power to shape 
social policies. 
2.3.3. Psychology 
For the founder of modern psychological analysis, 
(d. 1939 A.D.), human behaviour is shaped 
Sigmund Freud 
primarily by 
unconscious drives and motivations within the individual in 
conflict with the psychic and social inhibitions against the 
fulfillment of these drives. 
as follows: 5 
Titus characterises his position 
"According to Freud the life energy of a person, or the 
structure of the personality, is divided into three parts: 
The id, the deep subsconscious realm of instinct, impulse, 
and passion; the ego, the element of individuality which 
is capable of deliberation and which at times exercises 
5. Titus,Living Issue , p. 64 
56 
some control over the impulses of the idi and the superego. 
an internilisation of the demands of society that has been 
called conscience". 
A psychologically healthy person is one in whom the ego is able 
to successfully mediate between the demands of the id and those 
of the superego which are often in conflict. Guilt, anxiety and 
the other forms of psychological maladjustment occur when this 
mediation of the ego is unsuccessful. Freud, while not being a 
biological determinist, regarded cultures and societies and 
different aspects of them, such as religion, as only being 
distinguishable by the degree or intensity of the repression of 
instinct. This position has been tempered today in the 
writings of people such as Carl Jung and Eric Fromm. Jung 
introduced the distinction between the individual and collective 
conscience seeing the latter as profound expressions of the 
communal experience of human beings. Fromm also insists that 
much of human behaviour is culturally rather than biologically 
conditioned and a productive person is one who has a sense of 
his or her own authority and the courage of their convictions. 
Gestalt psychology developed by people such as Max Wertheimer 
and Wolfgang Kohler, stressed the view that the whole is more 
than the sum of its parts. The whole often has qualities not 
present in its parts. When applied to the human personality, 
behaviour then is said to be determined, not by discreet and 
isolated factors, but by an integrated personality perceiving a 
total situation. 
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2.4. Scientific View of the Person 
2.4.1. Evolution and Evolutionism 
The scientific interpretation of the human person asserts that 
people and all their activities are determined by the laws of 
physics and chemistry. The human person is merely a complex or 
higher form of life who may be explained by the same laws that 
govern all other matter. The very idea of evolution can be 
traced back to the Middle Ages, to the doctrine of the prophetic 
abbot, Joachim of Fiore. 6 With his doctrine of the three ages a 
completely new type of Christian expectation of the end of time 
emerged in which the idea of evolution and progress is applied 
to the history of salvation. Human history as paralleled with 
the history of salvation is seen as a progressive self-
realisation and sel-f-revelation of the divine Trinity. When 
Charles Darwin (d. 1882 A.D.), published his book: Origin of 
Species, the theory of organic evolution began to gain 
widespread acceptance. Not that Darwin was necessarily the 
,. 
first, for during the hundred years before his book, ground had 
been prepared by a considerable number of careful investigators, 
including Linnaeus, Lyell, Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck. The 
evidence for organic evolution which has been accumulating for 
about two hundred years cannot be set forth in our limited 
space. The main fields, however, from which· the evidence has 
come include the following: comparative anatomy (the study of 
6. Ernest Benz, . 1967, -==E~v_,o::..::l:...:u=t=i"""o~n:..___,a""'n=d,__--==C"-=h:.:.;r=i_,.s..::t::.::i""'a""n~---'-'H,_,o"-..p:;e.;e:::....:..: _ _,_M~a""'n'-'--' =s 
Concept of the Future from the Early Fathers to Teilhard de 
Chardin, (London: Victor Gollanz), p. 35 
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the structural correspondence in bones, muscles, etc. that 
exists among the great divisions of animals); vestigal remains 
(organs and glands which continue to exist even though they have 
lost their function in higher forms); embryology (the study of 
organisms in the early stages of development from the fertilised 
ovum) ; fossils (the remains of extinct forms of animals and the 
early stages of animals that exist today preserved in the 
earth's crust) ; geographic distribution of various life forms 
in the various parts of the world; domestication and 
experimentation; and finally, classification (animals are 
arranged on an ascending order of complexity established by 
blood and fluid tests) . Perhaps what is the strongest argument 
for the fact of evolution is that the evidence from the various 
fields of research which we have listed, fits into a single 
pattern thus forming one united theoretical whole. However, a 
distinction must be drawn between the fact of evolution and the 
philosophical position of evolutionism. Both share the basic 
postulate that all beings in the universe and, indeed, the 
universe as a whole, evolves from more simpler forms to more 
complex states. However, with evolutionism the sole cause 
behind this change and the sole reason for the change is seen in 
the inevitable struggle for life and the existence of chance 
mutations in the structure of existent forms. Darwin 7 might 
well have seen a Creator at the start of this process for he 
concludes his Origin of Species as such: 
"Thus from the war of nature, from famine and death, the 
7. Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor, 1980, Great Books of the 
Western World, 54 val., (London: Encyclopedia Britannica), The 
Origin of Species: By means of Natural Selection, by Charles 
Darwin, p. 243 
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most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, 
namely, the production of mammals, directly follows. There 
is a grandeur in this view of life, with its several 
powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into 
a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has 
gone on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so 
simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most 
wonderful have been and' are being evolved." 
This nascent deism, however, was stillborn as other influences 
(pre-dominantly that of Nietzsche and the dialetical materialism 
of Karl Marx), hardened the position into one of atheistic 
evolutionism: where chance is elevated to the only real dynamo 
1n an eternal universe. Jacques Monod, a contemporary advocate 
of this position sums up its essential thesis as follows: 8 
" ... it necessarily follows that chance alone is at the 
source of every innovation, of all creation in the 
biosphere. Pure chance, absolutely free but blind, at the 
very root of the stupendous edifice of evolution: this 
central concept of modern biology is no longer one among 
other possible or even conceivable hypotheses. It is today 
the sole conceivable hypothesis, the only one compatable 
with observed and tested fact For modern theory 
evolution is not a property of living beings since it stems 
from the very imperfections of the conserving mechanism 
which indeed constitutes their unique privilege." 
In this view the human person in all his/her distinctive 
behaviour is merely a more specialised reflection of these basic 
8. Jacques Monod, 1974, Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the 
National Philosophy of Biology, (London: Collins), pp. 110-113 
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laws of chance and survival. Even the human being's moral sense 
and conscience, Darwin explains merely in terms of the social 
instinct in all animals: 9 
"The following proposition seems to me in a high degree 
probable namely, that any animal whatever endowed with 
well marked social instincts, the parental and filial 
affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a 
moral sense or conscience as soon as its intellectual 
powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as 
in man." 
2.4.2. Contending Theories 
In modern scientific circles there are, however, a number of 
dissenting voices to the picture painted by Darwinian evolution. 
These come particularly in the area of difficulties in the DNA 
and fossil record. In his influential book: Evolution: A 
Theory in Crisis, Michael Denton argues very forcefully that in 
order to justify the gradual natural mechanism of evolution as 
conceived by Darwin, two important phenomena need to be shown to 
exist. Firstly, the existence of many transitional forms and 
secondly, that the chance that atoms 'naturally' combine to form 
the simpler living molecules is very high. Both of these have 
however, never been proven. What has been proven to date is 
that from the fossil record, it is clear that some species have 
ceased to exist. Secondly, that within species there has been 
development and growth and also that some species have broken up 
9. Ibid., p. 304 
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into sub-species that are converted into new species when 
reproductive isolation occurs, and thirdly, that is due to the 
adaptive pressures instigated by the environment. However, the 
failure of homology10 , the lack of transitional records in the 
fossil record11 , and the equidistant isolation on the biological 
and genetic level of all species (major) are the primary reasons 
why the following conclusion can be drawn: 12 
"Frustrated with the empirical absence of intermediate 
forms and with the difficulty of conceiving of gradual 
functional transitions, there has been an upsurge recently 
of this traditional alternative to gradualism, the concept 
of evolution by saltation, the idea that new organs and 
types emerge suddenly following some sort of massive 
macromutation." 
By far the most difficult hurdle to cross, however, is the 
transition from the so called prebiotic soup to the simplest of 
living cells: 13 
"To get a cell by chance would require at least one hundred 
functional proteins to appear simultaneously in one place. 
This is one hundred simultaneous events each of an 
independent probability which could hardly be more than 10 
to the power of -20 giving a combined probability of 10 to 
the power of -2000." 
This complexity of living systems and the incredible ingenuity 
manifest in their design leads Denton to conclude that Paley's 
argument for design is still very alive and revelant and it is 
10. Michael Denton, 1986, Evolution: A Theory in Crisis, 
(Bethesda, Maryland: Adler & Adler), pp. 149-150 
11. Ibid., pp. 187-193 
12. Ibid., p. 230 
13. Ibid., p. 323 
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still logically and empirically consistent to extend this 
analogy to an explanation of the origin of these living 
systems14 . In this view, human beings who are the most complex 
of these living systems and human behaviour, would be seen to be 
an exposition and revelation of the rational will of a Creator. 
2.4.3. Positivism and Pragmatism 
Impressed by. the advances of the natu:r;:-al sciences, positivism 
arose in embryo form in the empirical writings of the British 
Philosophers: Francis Bacon (d. 1626 A.D.), John Locke (d. 1704 
A.D.) and David Hume (d. 1776 A.D.) and reached its zenith in 
the early writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein (d. 1951 A.D.). The 
starting point of positivism is that the only possible source of 
knowledge is our sense experience. Posti vely, this line of 
thinking underlines our responsibility to reality as it is and 
not as we would like it to be. However, negatively it lacks 
openness to experience in all its dimensions including the 
religious and metaphysical, and is therefore silent in the face 
of the great human problems. Positivism is also echoed in the 
writings of John Dewey (d. 1952 A.D.), the father of pragmatism. 
For Dewey human thought cannot construct great cosmic systems of 
reality but is only there for solving problems in an 
intelligent and reflective mann~r. 
14. Ibid. , p. 341 
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2.5. Systematic Reflection 
From our previous systematic reflection (cf pp. 37-42) we have 
characterised each human person as a unique, immortal unity, the 
uniqueness of which is established by the particular way each 
appropriates and develops his/her relational capacities (human 
nature) . At the centre of this nature is the 'heart' 
(cf pp. 15,41), where rational functions as well as decisions of 
the will occur. We would therefore, agree with the rationalist 
tradition (cf pp. 44-46) that reason is our most characteristic 
human activity and that there can be. no truly human experience 
which has not been conceptualised and integrated into the 
personality through the reason. This is why for example, we 
have seen that every historical understanding of the world 
always has within itself a corresponding self -understanding of 
the human person (cf p. 4). Understanding, as Descartes rightly 
saw (cf p. 45), always involves a knowing human subject, and, as 
Lonergan notes is therefore rooted in: 15 
" ... the more basic invariant structure of the human 
consciousness with its movement from experience to 
understanding, to judgement, and finally to decision." 
However, we do not share the basic anthropological depiction of 
the rationalist which would split the reason or mind from the 
body as two distinct substances ( cf pp. 45-46) . In the history 
of philosophy there have been a number of positions describing 
the mind/body relationship. The rationalist would ascribe to 
Interactionism, which depicts body and mind as two separate 
15. Bernard J. Lonergan, 1978, Insight: A Study 
Understanding, (San Francisco: Harper & Row), p. 274 
of Human 
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substances which interact causally to produce human behaviour. 
The great weakness of this position is to describe how these two 
substances (different in nature) can be causally related. 
Descartes himself could not escape this dilemma and tried to 
locate the interaction in the pineal gland ( cf p. 46) , which, 
because it is a bodily organ cannot be a solution, for the 
question still remains. Attempts to meet this objection led to 
Parallelism: mental processes and physical processes are equally 
real, but they are not related, but merely accompany each other 
in time. This solution denies the problem rather than explaining 
it, for. in no way can it explain how sudden interruptions in 
thought and decision
1 
or in physical processes1 are automatically 
coincided with changes in the parallel •substance'. The 
position we would agree with is the Double Aspect theory which 
would hold that neither the mind nor the body are completely 
seperate or independent of one another. Both mind and body are 
expressions of a deeper underlying reality that appears as mind 
when we experience it from inside, or subjectively, and as body, 
when we view it from the outside, or objectively. Evolutionism 
(cf p. 59), Pragmatism and Positivism (cf p. 63), fall short in 
viewing the person only objectively, while neglecting, that in 
the particular synthesis of mind and body characteristic of the 
human person, a new reality emerges. This new reality has, as 
Gestalt psychologists rightly assert (cf p. 57), qualities not 
present in its individual parts. In other words, what emerges 
is personality or unique relational qualities which characterise 
each person's essence and establishes his/her identity. 
Further, we do not share the basic optimism of the Rationalists, 
that knowledge necessarily implies virtue. Firstly, because our 
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perceptions are always conditional, and, as the Phenomenologists 
correctly observe (cf pp. 48-49), always imply intentionality. 
Whatever we assert, is asserted within certain conditions and 
conceptualised in some ways. While it is true that we must 
continually strive to see reality as it is (cf p. 63), we can 
never totally escape from our individual and social framework. 
At the base of each human discipline, therefore, are various 
hermeneutical viewpoints which determine the observational 
experience and its interpretation. Even within physical 
science, both theories and what specific data are collected, are 
dependent on the prevailing paradigm in vogue. While an 
accumulation of anomalies and ad hoc hypotheses may eventually 
lead to a paradigm shift, in which old data are re-interpreted 
in new ways and new data are sought, this shift is still a 
judgement of the scientific community. Secondly, not only is 
there no purely objective knowledge, but there is no guarantee 
that knowledge will be applied correctly in the guidance of 
. 
behaviour. History witnesses to the numerous instances where 
knowledge has been used to exploit, rather than enhance, the 
development of the human person. We have already seen how in 
each act of freedom we are able to envisage the original unity 
of being (cf p. 38). This natural human drive towards 
transcendence pushes one in the end to the multiple mystery of 
the ultimate: the horizon of truth, goodness and Being. 
However, many have resisted, and continue to resist this drive 
(cf p. 16). Philosophy can help us to reach this horizon, but it 
cannot penetrate its veil. Karl Rahner describes one at this 
point, as a hearer. This then, is at the heart of religious 
experience, which is a Word coming from this horizon. This Word 
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we have seen (cf pp. 40-41) coming to us, is mediated through 
creation, our conscience, other people, society and history. It 
is because it is mediated, that religious experience and the 
faith it evokes, cannot weaken the insights of other areas of 
knowledge, for it provides their real context, but not their 
content. 
A human person, it is true, is never a finished project 
(cf p. 44), and the human person becomes more of a person as the 
reality of his/her relational dynamism develops (cf p. 38). 
However, we would not agree with the Existentialists (cf p. 47) 
that this automatically implies that our own essence and the 
meaning in life is only something we 'create' for ourselves. 
Essence and existence are mutually dependent. Any development 
implies an already existing structural potentiality. As 
existence becomes more specialised (i.e. develops), the scope of 
essence is broadened, which in turn, lays the foundation for 
further development. In the struggle to 'create' value, we 
discover value already as an existential given. Since the human 
person is capable of transcending him/her self in the knowledge 
of God, it must mean that his/her whole life is already 
orientated towards God, who is present in the person as the 
transcendent condition which makes such knowledge possible. God 
therefore, is not a Being separate from the human person, but 
God is Being itself: permeating a person and transcending 
him/her as well. God is, therefore, always present within us, 
even before we begin, however tentatively and hesitatingly, to 
come to terms with our knowledge of God. 
This idea is the kernel behind the mediaeval conception of the 
'ius gentium', for there are principles of existence that 
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precede our conception of them. We would agree with Hegel 
(cf p. 50) that the state is the 'mind objectified', that 
society can be the human being's highest expression of his/her 
nature. This is because only in relation with others can one's 
perception of reality be put to the test of adequacy 
(sufficiently rich to account for the whole of experience), 
coherence (inner unity with other models of explanation), and 
existential relevance (adequate reference to the objective 
other) . Sally McFague sees a similar dynamic at large in the 
community of believers: 1 6 
" ... metaphors and models of God are understood to be 
"discovered" as well as "created", to relate to God's 
reality not in the sense of being literally in 
correspondence with it, but as versions or hypotheses of it 
that the community accepts as relatively adequate". 
Further, this unfolding of knowledge and nature does take place 
within a dialectic dynamic between individual and society. 
However, as we have noted (cf p. 12), this presupposes replacing 
the mechanism of the 'flesh' with that of the 'Spirit' . We 
neither share the pessimism of Hobbes and the Reformers (that 
human nature is totally corrupt), nor the naive optimism of 
Rousseau (that society corrupts a natural innocence) . When we 
speak of sin we are usually referring to two interrelated 
concepts: firstly, its primary meaning of a personal act 
involving intelligence and free will; and secondly, its 
secondary meaning of original sin, where we normally mean the 
effect of sin upon the individuals constituting the human race. 
16. R. Russell, W. Stoegel, G. Coyne, editors, 1988, Physics, 
Philosophy, and Theology: A Common Ouest for Understanding, 
(Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana), p. 254 
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For the Christian the fundamental proof for the actuality of 
original sin and its sad effects is deduced from the absolute 
universality of the redeeming death of Christ (cf p. 28). But 
the term sin, used in the second sense, is used analogously 
( cf p. 32) . What is being described is not personal sin, but 
rather a condition of freedom prior to its actual exercise. In 
other words, original sin, to be really sin and yet not personal 
sin, must be a structure or qualifying process in the dynamic of 
freedom itself. Modern biblical exegesis has shown that in 
Romans 5:12, Paul did not intend to teach an inherited sin. 
Rather he teaches in this text two important insights: firstly, 
the universal inescapability of the depredation of sin, as well 
as that of personal responsibility for this condition. This is 
true of Romans 5:19 as well, for here in 5:19b, those who were 
justified by virtue of Christ's obedience, are set in opposition 
to thosec: sinners from the time of Adam until now. - -=-Tf --this 
justification comes to one as a resu-lt of one's intentional· bond 
of faith, so too must the damnation of sinners come from an 
intentional rejection of this offer. These considerations have 
been interpreted in contemporary theology in four general 
stances. Firstly, in Biblical Fundamentalism, the insights of 
modern science are ignored and original sin is seen as a guilty 
condition inherited from Adam either by the biological means of 
procreation or in the juridical sense of the inherited sentence 
of damnation. Secondly, there are those who like Piet 
Schoonenberg (and Rousseau) equate the distinctiveness of 
original sin with the sin of the world. This is the accumulation 
of sin in the history of human beings · which, in turn, 
constitutes the concrete situation into which everyone is born. 
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A third position gives more credence to the evolutionary 
perspective and emphasises that paradise is not a state at the 
beginning of our existence as humans, but a utopic symbol of the 
goal of that existence. The last position is the denial of 
original sin: what the doctrine seeks to express is the 
entrapment of human freedom to sin, and that all people depend 
completely on God for the true exercise of freedom. Each of 
these positions has a lot to commend it, for each emphasizes 
an important aspect of the total picture. However, in each we 
believe other equally important insights are sacrificed because 
they lack adequate tools to incorporate them. We, therefore, 
offer our own understanding of the question. However named, 
there are two natural forces within God's creation which ensure 
the continued growth and evolution of all forms of 
existence. The exact balance between these two forces 
life and 
(entropy 
and negentropy in-co-=-- Segundo's terminology) , at any stage of 
development is establ±shed by instinct. Instinct can be defined 
as the structural and behavioural potentials (relational 
potentials) which have been developed to ensure a certain level 
of synthesis. Even in inanimate compositions, inherited 
potential or instinct ensures the survival and structural 
propensities of the organism. A general rule regarding this 
synthesis has been put into the creation (we discuss this 
further in chapter 3) the higher the synthesis, the greater the 
scope of instinct. In other words, the more complex the 
structure the greater the range provided by the instinctive 
code. Because organisms are essentially part of an entire eco-
system, they are in continual interaction which awakes the force 
of negentropy to expand the structural complexity and so the 
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scope of instinct. Death is the natural process or, put 
differently ( cf p. 26) , the divinely willed safety valve in 
nature by which entropy breaks down an organism so as to provide 
space for newly emerging syntheses. Work is the natural 
expression of the instinctive potential of any synthesis 
(cf p. 35). As the different structures evolved, there came a 
time when one structure evolved to the level of instinctive 
potential that opened to personality (cf p. 68, i.e. 
consciousness) . Its structural complexity had so expanded that 
it was now able to freely determine its own synthesis. It was 
now able to freely possess its own instinctual behaviour within 
the range provided by it structural complexity. What was most 
natural would have been that people here should choose the 
synthesis which best expressed their new nature, that is the one 
I 
which expressed, because of their freedom, their transcendence 
to God (cf pp. 39,40). However, what is called original sin is 
the choice they all made to perpetuate instinctive syntheses 
from previous levels of development which were damaging to this 
new level of freedom. Original sin is therefore, not so much a 
fall from a perfect state as a refusal to rise to a new level of 
freedom (cf pp.8,16,21,28). The effects of this choice were 
manifold. Firstly, an instinctive option becomes embedded 
within the fabric of being, not removing the other options, but 
constitutionally obscuring them (and so is passed to each new 
generation by propagation, cf p. 31, named concupiscence by the 
church). Secondly, this choice takes social forms of behaviour, 
which survive the individual and are institutionalised in 
cultural forms which further obscure freedom and provide further 
resistance to its emergence (cf pp. 21,35, and what Marx 
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rightly depicts as social alienation, cf p. 54). Thirdly, 
because humans made an unnatural choice, their relationship to 
the natural was disturbed and so death and work, for example, 
were no longer creative factualities, but pathetic reminders of 
their rebellion. In each successive new generation, humans are 
born genetically and culturally into this stream of alienation, 
and further enhance it through their own choices, embedding the 
vicious circle further. It is only the Spirit of God that can 
break this circle, enabling the person to die to sin (the 
accumulated resistances both internal and external, cf pp. 2"8-
29), and reinforce the newly awakened potential this death 
brings about in the concrete decisions of their life. A fact 
concretely shown in the life, death and resurrection of Christ, 
who has thus become the: "first fruits of all who have fallen 
asleep" (1 Co 15: 20). 
We would, therefore, agree with Mead (cf p. 52), that there 
remains in all persons a creative, moral potential which, when 
evoked, allows them to critique, preserve and change their 
social conceptions of reality and the particular institutions 
that express them. It is this creative aspect which means that 
society can never be reduced to a mere exposition of economic 
forces, which Marx contended (cf p. 54). Marx was at a loss, 
also, to explain the preservation of the collective forms of 
this creativity in various different economic dispensations, or 
why similar economic arrangements could produce such diverse 
critiques and creative insights. We agree with Fiorenza17 , that: 
"There is no such thing as an institution that is purely 
17. Francis S. Fiorenza, John P. 
Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press), p. 131 
Galvin, editors, 1991, 
Perspectives, 2 vols., 
sinful or a pure social grace. 
movements may spring to mind that 
archetype of a social sin or grace. 
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Of course some social 
appear to be the very 
But generally both of 
these antithetical concepts, social sin and social grace, 
are heuristic. They are questioning categories that shed a 
particular light on certain aspects of social constructions 
and allow one to perceive them in a certain way." 
From what has been said, it is clear that, as Freud depicted 
(cf p. 56), there is in each person a deep, and unconscious area 
of instinct, as · well as a socially determined and a creative 
aspect. However, instinct or the 'flesh', only evokes conflict 
with the socially determined aspect of people to the degree that 
the alienation latent in each is reinforced by the ongoing 
personal r choices of the person, which then stifle the 
development of the person's relational capacity or unique 
personhood (cf p. 32) 
We have already distinguished between the facts of evolution and 
the philosophy of evolutionism (2.4.1.). There we mentioned how 
evolutionism conceives chance to be the only real dynamo which 
has spurred this progression from the moment of original 
singularity in the universe to the creation of life on earth, 
leading to its conscious pinnacle in the life of human beings. 
The great weakness of this position is that within its own 
limits there cannot be what is so deftly called 'pure chance'. 
Chance conceived in this position always presupposes some pre-
existing organisation: either within the organisation itself 
whose mutations are selected by the environment; or in the 
environment that selects. On the macro level this means that 
evolutionism treats the universe as a given and cannot answer 
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why the universe exists in the particular mode that it does, nor 
what will be the final purpose of this universe. Clarke18 sums 
up as follows: 
Thus every finite being, not only each in particular, but 
any system as a whole that is finite and determinate in its 
mode of existence, as ours clearly is, needs a self-
sufficient infinite being to draw it out of the range of 
possibilities and make it to be in this particular way and 
no other. It does not matter how many other modes 
actually exist, or even all possible ones. Each one needs 
to be given actual existence according to its determinate 
mode, and no one can do it for itself." 
This same teleonomy is perceivable on the micro level, as 
Clarke19 also so clearly shows: 
"This innate positive drive to survive, to act, to 
interact, cannot be supplied by any random exterior 
conditions. It must be built into the active 
potentialities (or dispositional properties) of the very 
natures of the organisms themselves, prestructured from the 
beginning to interact with one another in basic determinate 
ways. It is this innate drive that is not supplied by 
evolutionary theory, but must ultimately be predetermined 
by some creative ordering Mind, that alone can transpose 
intelligible possibilities of order from creative idea to 
actual existence with focussed power." 
Evolutionism is, therefore, inaccurate in viewing creation in a 
totally impersonal way. The fact that evolution brings into 
18. Russell, Physics, p. 115 
19. Ibid., p. 120 
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existence human personhood suggests that in human beings the 
intelligible process of evolution is, as Hegel says, able to 
think itself. We have already seen how from the complexity of 
living systems and the incredible ingenuity manifested in their 
design, Denton concludes that the human species is the clearest 
exposition and revelation of the rational will of a Creator 
(2.4.2). The objections of Denton and other scientists means 
that there could be two interpretations to the evidence observed 
for evolution: The first interpretation would mean that species 
evolved in a type of biological relay, one species evolving into 
another so that from the first atoms to consciousness there is a 
gradual progression. The second interpretation would be a type 
of biological cross- country, where all species start off from 
some type of "miraculous mutation moment" together. Some fall 
out of the race having fulfilled their function, inspiring the 
others .to greate:r;:" performance. The debate between these two 
interpretations is likely to continue for a long time, but 
either interpretation does not negate the overall question of 
organisation and process, and the obvious purpose that it brings 
to life. The fact that, whatever process was at large, 
conscious personhood is brought to life, means that a free, 
conscious Agent must have existed in the initial organisation; 
must be the ultimate dynamic of the process and the final 
purpose that it is meant to bring to light. 
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Chapter 3 
Towards an Understanding of 
evolution and Personality 
3.1. General 
We have already argued that Pius XII' s insistence that God 
creates the 'soul' immediately, while leaving the question of 
the evolution of the 'body' from other living beings an open 
question, means that he is asserting that the "how" -of God's 
creation of human beings is open to investigation, but not the 
"why" (cf pp. 38-39). The "why" of God's creation of people 
we also noted implies two things: firstly, that God is 
ultimately responsible for the physical dynamics that brings 
forth human life, and, secondly, that God sets God's self up 
as the horizon that enables humankind generally and 
individually to realise ~ts personhood. 
examine these two aspects. 
In this chapter we 
From the preceding chapters, it should be clear that we have 
argued for a more dynamic view of the human person in the 
light of modern scientific and philosophic reflection. It is 
important at this point therefore, to clarify some of the 
terms that we have used so far and will be using further. Our 
discussion of the mind/body relationship (cf pp. 64-65), saw 
us accepting a Double Aspect perspective. Mind and body are 
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interdependent aspects reflecting a deeper underlying reality 
and unity. This reality, which the church has called 'soul' 
(cf p. 39) is the unique, immortal unity that characterises 
each person. We would call this preferably one's Personality 
or Personhood: the particular way persons appropriate their 
human nature and develop its relational capacities. This 
human nature is a unity of mind (the biblical 'heart' and the 
psychological 'consciousness') and body (the biblical 'flesh' 
and 'soul') . We have seen that this essence (Personality) 
and existence (human nature) are also mutually dependent: as 
existence becomes more 





of essence is 
existence the 
particular synthesis 
called instinct (cf 
that has developed between the two is 
p. 69 )1 which determines the relational 
capacities of the organism in question. In human beings, the 
structural complexity of existence has so expanded that 
instinct could be replaced by Personality: a freely chosen 
synthesis of relational qualities. It is this freedom (the 
bibiical 'spirit') that opens one to the spiritual realm (cf 
p. 42) and ultimately to the Spirit of GodJ which in turn 
enables one to develop one's relational capac ties so as to 
reach a coherent maturity and fulfillment in Christ. 
3.2. The Evolution of Life (Dust that Breathes) 
3.2.1. Scientific Outlines 
The outlines of evolutionary history are written in pencil for 
each new discovery confirms the vast spectrum of unanswered 
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questions. What happened on earth could be more or less 
typical of the evolution of life on many worlds. But in 
details such as the chemistry of proteins or the neurology of 
brains, the story of life on earth could be unique in all the 
Milky Way. ~he planet, earth, condensed out of interstellar 
gas and dust some 4. 6 billion years ago. From the fossil 
record the origin of life happened soon after, perhaps around 
4 billion years ago. The first stirrings of life were very 
humble: from simple hydrogen rich molecules there arose the 
earliest ancestor of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) which spells 
out the hereditary instructions for the making of a given 
organism. By 3 billion years ago a number of one cell plants 
had joined together and the first multi-cellular organisms 
evolved. About 2 billion years ago sex was invented and two 
organisms exchanged whole paragraphs of their DNA codes. New 
plants arose, which working co-operatively, brought a stunning 
change in the environment of the earth. These new green 
plants generated molecular oxygen and, as the atmosphere of 
the earth changed to one being filled with oxygen, the 
monopolising grip of algae was broken leading to an enormous 
proliferation of new life forms. This event which occurred 
some 6 hundred million years ago is known as the Cambrian 
Explosion. Before this explosion species seem to have 
succeeded one another rather slowly. However now, in rapid 
succession, the first fish and vertebrates appeared. Plants 
which had previously been restricted to the oceans began to 
colonise the land. Carl Sagan summarises the rest of the 
process of world-building as follows: 1 
1. Carl Sagan, 1981, Cosmos, (London: Macdonald Futura), p. 33 
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" ... the first insect evolved, and its descendants became 
the pioneers in the colonisation of the land by animals; 
then insects arose together with the amphibians, creatures 
something like the lung fish, able to survive both on land 
and in the water; the first trees and the first reptiles 
appeared; the dinosaurs evolved; mammals emerged, and 
then the first birds; the first flowers appeared; the 
dinosaurs became extinct; the earliest cetaceans, 
ancestors to the dolphins and whales, arose and in the 
same period the primates - ancestors to the monkeys, the 
apes and the humans. 
first creatures who 
Less than 10 million years ago, the 
closely resembled human beings 
evolved, accompanied by a spectacul,ar increase in brain 
size. And then, only a few million years ago, the first 
crude humans emerged." 
The earliest hominids (the type of ape that eventually led to 
the human person) , known as Australopithecus, walked upright 
on their hind legs, in a way similar to human beings, but the 
skull was very ape-like1 with a brain of around 400 cubic 
centimetres (much smaller than modern people's 1300 cubic 
centimetres) There seems to be two distinct types of 
Australopithecus living in Africa at the same time: 
Australopithecus africanus, a slender creature about 1.2 
metres tall with teeth and limbs similar to those of modern 
people, and Australopithecus robustus with a larger skull and 
stronger teeth and jaws. Human beings are classified 
scientifically as the animal Homo and the modern person 
belongs to the species, Homo sapiens (thinking people) . 
Scientists are, however, divided as to when a fossil should be 
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classified as Homo: some put it at a brain capacity of around 
750 cubic centimetres; others put it with the ability to make 
and use tools. Around 1.8 million years ago a hominid emerged 
with a larger brain capacity of 650 cubic centimetres. This 
creature was able to walk and run and was named by Louis 
Leakey as Homo habilis (handyman) because it seems clear that 
primitive tools had been made and used by the creature. Homo 
erectus appeared more than 1 million years ago and survived 
until about 200,000 years ago. In a cave in China a hearth 
that was about 500,000 years old was found with Homo erectus 
fossils. The hearth had been kept burning for hundreds of 
years and was probably used for warmth and for cooking food. 
About 130, 000 years ago the first Homo sapiens is known to 
have lived in Europe (Neanderthal man) and these people 
survived until around 35,000 years ago. Rather stockier and 
shorter than modern people, these hominids had a brain size 
similar to our own. The only significant difference was 
however, a ridge of bone running above their eyes. They began 
producing flake tools which were much sharper and more varied 
in shape than hand axes. The flakes were knocked out of the 
core of stones and were used for a variety of purposes such as 
knives, points, drills and scrapers. The origins of modern 
people are far from clear. It is clear that by 30,000 years 
ago Homo sapiens, as they are today, had appeared, and the new 
arrivals rapidly established themselves on every continent 
except the uninhabitable Antartic. From an archeological find 
in the Qafza Cave in Israel: 2 it seems likely that our own 
2. Dougal Dixon, Rupert Matthews, 1992, The Illustrated 
Encyclopedia of Prehistoric Life, (London: Hamlyn), p. 111 
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sub-species (Homo sapien sapiens) first evolved in the Middle 
East and then spread out to take over from the Neanderthals. 
This sub-species is also called Cro-magnon after the French 
site where their fossils were first discovered. Originally a 
hunter/gatherer sometime around 12,000 years ago, bands of 
people living around the Middle East began to raise their own 
food, planting crops and herding animals. The raising of 
wheat and barley then spread northwards through Europe 
eventually reaching Britain around 3, 000 B.C. A similar 
transition to farming was also occurring in the Hwang Ho 
valley in China around 5, 000 B.C., and among the people of 
Mexico around 4, 000 B.C. In the lands around the Eastern 
Mediterranean in the year 7,000 B.C., the first metal working 
activity began. In 3,000 B.C., the alloy known as bronze 
became the standard metal across most of Europe. In 1, 500 
B.C., among the Hittites living in present-day Turkey, a 
carbonised form of iron was discovered and the scene was set 
for the development of the modern technological world: 3 
"Equipped with agriculture and metal working, man was able 
to take the first strides on the path of civilization 
which has led to the modern technological world: a very 
different place from the world in which Homo first 
evolved." 
3.2.2. Scriptural Outlines 
A brief look at the Book of Genesis and other creation texts 
in the Old Testament will show that, as regards the structure 
3 . Ibid. I p. 12 2 
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of the created universe, the bible and the comparable 
literature of the Middle East generally agrees: earth is 
positioned between the upper and lower cosmic waters. This 
consensus is also echoed in the various modes used to describe 
the process: defeat of chaos, divine word, building, 
etc. However, what is strikingly distinctive of 
shaping, 
biblical 
creation faith is that this creation is attributed to a sole, 
transcendent deity, Yahweh the God of the Israelite. We have 
already noticed that from the great gambit of creation myths 
in the ancient East, the fact that the I'sraeli writers only 
chose the craftsmanship motives stresses God's concrete 
intervention on behalf of the human being (cf p. 17). 
Clifford sums up well the discarded options: 4 ~ 
"Whatever does not comport with that belief - creation by 
several deities or by a consort (sexual generation), the 
creator as originally within the primal mass,_ creation by 
trial and error, creation of humans to maintain the 
universe in place of unwilling gods - is denied." 
Another distinctive feature of Israelite creation faith is the 
analogy often drawn between creation and Covenant which 
ensures that creation is never viewed as something totally 
impersonal or neutral. It is, like the Covenant, a promise 
ordained to fulfillment. Hence the one word, bara, can 
indicate the original creation, God's action in history and 
God's final salvific intervention. So the association of 
creation, conception and resurrection in 2 M 7:22-29 is 
characteristic of this dynamic view. Creation is the magnalia 
4. Fiorenza, Systematic Theology, p. 166 
82 
dei and itself a salvific act since it founds and sustains the 
Covenant and the whole history of salvation. 
encapsulates: 5 
As Darlap 
"The beginning provides a totality with its essence and 
the consequent conditions of its realisation. Thus the 
beginning appears as a sum total, as it were, of the 
concrete preconditions of the historical being of man." 
As the Old Testament experience of God's saving power largely 
centred around the experience of the Covenant in history, so 
in the New Testament the experience of salvation centred 
around the experience of the Resurrection. This shift is not 
so noticeable in the Synoptic Gospels which for the most part 
reflect the Old Testament tradition of creation as the context 
fot the preaching of the Kingdom in the ministry of Jesus. The 
Kingdom which is the goal which God intends "from the creation 
of the world" (Mt 25:34), is thus central to the preaching of 
Jesus. The shift is, however, very discernible in the Pauline 
and Johannine literature, so much so, that is often held that 
the most important Pauline contribution is the conviction that 
God creates the world in Christ. It is particularly in 
Colossians 1:13-20 and Ephesians 1:3-14, that Paul develops 
his Christology of creation. The first of these is probably 
an old hymn to which Paul added an introduction and conclusion 
for each of the two verses. The introduction to the first 
(v.13b-14), and the ending of the second (v.21-22) both 
concern Christians being cleansed from sin and being made 
holy, so entering into the Kingdom of the beloved Son. The 
5. Karl Rahner, editor, 
Concise Sacramentum Mundi, 
by Adolf Darlap, p. 321 
1977, Encyclopedia of Theology: A 
(London: Burns & Oates), Protology 
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ending of the first verse (the last line of v.16-17) and the 
beginning of the second (v. 18) are brief summaries of the 
teaching of that verse. The first refers to Christ as the 
head, source and unifying principle of creation; and the 
second to Christ as the head, source and unifying principle of 
the redeemed universe, especially humankind in the Church. 
Christ is associated with the Father's creative activity as an 
equal. Paul expresses this in the ideas and language of the 
Wisdom literature: Jesus is the power and wisdom of God (1 
Co 1:24); the image of the Father (2 Co 4:4; Col 1:15); the 
first-born before all creation (Rm 8:18, 24; Col 1:.18) . 
Everything is created "for" Christ, because God "wanted all 
fullness to be found in him" (v.17,19, see also Ep 1:5.9-10). 
The fact that creation is the product of the Word-Wisdom and 
is directed towards a goal, means that the Universe is 
intelligible and open to investigation by reason. Creation is 
not something static which is only completed in the past, but 
is being dynamically drawn towards its goal, which is the 
glorified Christ, "the first-born from the dead" (v.18). The 
unity of Jew and Greek in Christ (Ga 3:28; Col 3:11), is only 
an outward and visible sign, on the human leve~ of the unifying 
power at work in creatures and in the whole universe (Co 
1 3:11). 
These themes are re-emphasised in Ephesians 1:3-14, while the 
focus is on the end of humankind. It is a hymn of praise and 
thanksgiving to the Trinity, which also sees redemption in 
terms of God's wider purpose centred on Christ. Here, as in 
Colossians, Christ clearly exists with the Father as one God 
in all eternity and before the creation of any creatures. In 
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verse 10 it is clear that everything is to, be bound together 
in Christ in a dynamic unity in which the perfection of all 
things will be achieved: a fact that will only become manifest 
at the end .of time, but also a fact that starts with Jesus' 
entering into glory. John, we have noted, also develops the 
Old Testament logos theme to incorporate the centrality of the 
Son's role in redemption and creation. In John 1, John, like 
Paul earlier, adapts an early hymn to Christ for his purpose, 
and in line with the Old Testament, borrows and reshapes 
elements from outside sources. For example, John identifies 
the creative logos of Philo with God, but against the 
dualistic notion of the gnostics of equal forces of light and 
darkness, John is clear that there is only one creative power, 
the Light, who is the divine Word. John gives to the Word of 
Genesis 1 an absolute beginning, or possibly even renames the 
sapiental "Wisdom" as Word, and this Word is the ultimate 
ground of being: the incarnate Son of God. It must be pointed 
out here that the New Testament writers are too realistic just 
to depict creation as an uninterrupted process of unification 
in Christ. Often in Paul and John the word "cosmos" is even 
used to depict reality in rebellion against God (Rm 8:18-23). 
Paul sees the universe as being in the grip of the powers of 
darkness (Ep 6:12), who blind people's minds and lead them to 
live according to false principles (Col 2:20) and fall into 
moral corruption (Rm 1:18). James echoes this view (Jm 4:4), 
and Peter speaks of a universe that "is sunk in vice" (2 
p 1: 4) . These and other passages are a salient reminder to 
the advocates of science who would ignore the intimate link 
between the destiny of humans and the overall purpose of the 
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universe (cf pp. 60-61). They link the cosmos, the world and 
humankind in a common lot and if any are not subsumed in/under 
Christ's saving influence, then the only destiny is one of 
eventual disintegration and meaningless diffusion. 
3.2.3. Teleonomy of Structural Growth: Anthropic 
Principle of Evolution 
Fundamentally, our brief survey here of the scriptural data on 
creation, and the New Testament emphasis of Christ as lord of 
all ages, means that we cannot in reality speak of a purely 
"natural" theology. Irenaeus is often quoted as saying: 6 "His 
will is the substance of all things", and we have depicted 
God's will earlier as an unitive will (cf p. 25) which can be 
impeded and disfigured by the action of a person's hardness of 
heart (cf p. 16). Scripture, as we have seen ( cf p. 8, 84) , 
does not· attempt to hide the disparity between flesh and 
spirit, between God's unitive plan in Christ and the forces of 
darkness, and between meaningless diffusion and constructive 
destiny. Christians throughout the centuries have had to 
confront various forms of pantheism, dualism and monism ( cf 
p 30,32), and it was out of these confrontations that emerged 
the characteristic Christian theology of creation. Most of 
the Eastern and Western theology from Augustine onwards, 
employed the fundamental notions of nee-platonism in order to 
give a relatively coherent understanding of the world as 
created reality. In a similar way, the Middle Ages wrestled 
gradually with the problems by incorporating elements of 
6. Fiorenza, Systematic Theology, p. 212 
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Aristotelian metaphysics. This reached its zenith in the 
thought of Thomas Aquinas1 who in the Summa Theologiae, deals 
with the coming forth of creatures from God immediately after 
the treatise concerning the procession of the divine Persons. 
For Thomas, while these two. processions must be distinguished 
in order to safeguard the freedom of the creative act and the 
full consubstantiality of the divine Persons, they are 
nonetheless related. God, according to Thomas, is creator by 
virtue of God's very essence: because it is God's nature 
simply to be, all being is traceable back to God as its source 
and first cause. Creation, thus, is an act in which the 
triune God acts as the one God, in which the trinitarian unity 
of operation corresponds to a trinitarian unity of being. It 
follows, therefore, that any appropriation of a particular 
action in, or facet of creation to one Person; is dictated 
either by the particular nature of that Person's mode of 
procession or by the relation in which that Person of the 
Trinity stands to the other Persons. So, for example, the 
appropriation of power to the Father and wisdom to the the 
Son, enables Thomas, with the categories of Aristotle, to 
think of them as efficient and exemplary cause respectively. 
The appropriation of goodness to the Spirit leads him to link 
the Spirit w.ith the notion of the final cause. Walker sums 
this up as follows: 7 
"the divine Spirit is the 'Life-Giver'; he is the one who 
"guides and quickens all things created by the Father 
through the Son", and who "vivifies and guides all things 
7. David A. Walker, 1993, Trinity and Creation in the Theology 
of St. Thomas Aquinas, The Thomist 57:7, p.443-455 
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to their fitting ends". The end to which all things tend 
towards1 is nothing other than the highest good, God 
himself. All things desire to share God's goodness as 
much as is possible for them according to their creaturely 
natures". 
In sum therefore, for Aquinas, the being which is God's is 
uncreated and identical with God's essence, while the being of 
creatures is created and is an act which can only be realised 
in terms of potency; for a creature, essence and existence are 
always in flux and mutually dependent (cf pp. 67, 76) . The 
great weakness of Aquinas' depiction of God as "ipsum esse", 
is that it tells us very little about this essence, except 
that it essentially is. Secondly, since creation is an act in 
potency, it is difficult to conceive how things can "desire" 
to share God's goodness if their essence is never to reach 
consciousness. Thirdly, Berkhof rightly shows that Genesis 1, 
in depicting the creation as good, did not imply a static, 
perfect universe. Rather it implies a universe fitted for the 
purpose of communion between God and people: 8 
"The statement that the world was created good (tob), even 
very good (tab mead, Gen. 1) was wrongly taken as evidence 
of perfection: tab, however, is not "perfect", but 
"suitable for its purpose", namely communion between God 
and man." 
Although classical metaphysics (cf P. 32), begins with the 
primordiality of being, a better place to start, as in the 
metaphysics of Teilhard, would be in the primordiality of 
8. Hendrikus Berkhof, 1979, 
to the Study of the Faith, 
p. 171 
Christian Faith: An Introduction 
(Grand Rapids: William Eerdmann) , 
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union. In other words, being is a consequence of union and 
union constitutes being. To be is to be united. Not only 
does this definition help to focus the Thomistic definition of 
God as ipsum esse, but it also establishes an inclusive 
metaphysical resonance with modern quantum physics. Niels 
Bohr9 has shown that it is impossible to separate energy from 
matter or a moving body from its act of motion; so in a meta-
physics of "unire" the act of union cannot be divorced from 
the act of being. This tells us then, that what is intrinsic 
to God's act of existence, to God's being, is that God unites: 
first God unites the Persons of the Trinity, and then, the 
multiple to God's own self. Because God is absolutely self-
sufficient, God is absolutely self-communicating. 
this as such: 10 
Vale put 
"As begotten, the Son is the polar opposite of the Father, 
who is unbegotten. The Holy Spirit is the Gift who "is 
given through the will", the bond of love and the 
principle of unity ... Thus the self -diffusion wears two 
faces, one of singularity in plurality (One God in three 
Persons), the other of plurality in singularity (Three 
Persons who are one God)." 
- So the Godhead is the fullness of unity, expressed in a 
perfect opposition among persons (cf p. 37), and resulting in 
absolute, independent, self-sufficient unity. In. creating, 
God brings into being God's polar opposite, that is, absolute 
diffusion, and on this, God exerts God's power of unification 
ad extra. That which in itself is incapable of comimg to 
9. R. Russell, Physics, p. 348 
10. Carol Jean Vale, 1992, Teilhard de Chardin: Ontogenesis 
vs. Ontology, Theological Studies 57:7, pp. 443-455 
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unity, is brought into discernible being and complexifies 
through a process of unification. God, in this sense, adds to 
God's unity as this diffusion is drawn into increasingly 
higher forms of being, and simultaneously, more complex forms 
of consciousness. Human effort assists this process or 
inhibits it, and as humankind coalesces into a state of co-
reflective unity, it opens the way for incorporation into 
Christ, so that, that which once was separate from God, in a 
condition of unresolved disunity, becomes one with God in the 
unified mystical body of Christ. As Teilhard prays: 11 
"Yet can anything, Lord, in fact do more for my 
understanding and my soul to make you an object of love, 
the only object of love, than to see that you - the centre 
ever opened into your own deepest core - continue to grow 
in intensity, that there is an added glow·to your lustre, 
at the same pace as you pleromize yourself by gathering 
together the Universe and subjecting it ever more fully at 
the heart of your . being ( • until the time for returning, 
You and the World in You, to the bosom of Him from whom 
you came')?" 
This position of ontogenesis has the following advantages: 
firstly, as we have seen, it enables us to focus the ontology 
of Aquinas and distinguish what is intrinsic to God's essence 
as Being; secondly, it not only echoes well with modern 
physics, but enables us to make sense of Aquinas• proposition 
that: 12 
11. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, 1978, The Heart of Matter, 
(London: Collins), p.57 
12. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: Vol 1, · The Existence of 
God. Part 1: Questions 1-13, (New York: Image Books), p. 128 
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"Now since it is God's nature to exist, he it must be who 
properly causes existence in creatures, just as it is fire 
itself sets other things on fire. And God is causing this 
effect in things not just when they begin to exist, but 
all the time they are maintained in existence." 
This is how things can be said to "desire" God (cf p. 83): in 
Teilhard' s concept of psychogenesis, as subatomic particles 
complexify to become the primary building blocks of life, the 
psychic energy of God (Uniting Consciousness) centrifies and 
leads nonreflective life to thought. Therefore, incipient 
consciousness begins at time's beginning as both the driving 
force and ultimate goal of evolution: this, in turn,is evident 
in the biological law of increasing centro-complexity 
consciousness, what Teilhard calls the law of cephalization: 13 
" ... the greatest discovery made in this century is 
probably the realisation that the passage of Time may best 
be measured by the gradual gathering of Matter in 
superposed groups, of which the arrangement, ever richer 
and more centralised, radiates outwards from an ever more 
luminous fringe of liberty and interiority." 
The third advantage of this position is that it is able to 
more adequately address the issue of evil and the charge of 
capricious governance. With ontogenesis it is clear that 
since the world is always in process, it will be necessarily 
incomplete. Evil is then a by-product of evolutive maturation; 
in the inanimate realm we find discord and decomposition, in 
living beings, suffering and sin in the domain of freedom. 
13. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, 1969, The Future of Man, 
(London: Collins), p. 69 
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illustrate what is meant ln the reply of This might well 
Yahweh to Job, for in any process of increasing freedom and 
there will be the useful, the bizarre and even 
(Jb 38-39) . In the insights of Friedrich 
consciousness 
the playful 
Schleierrnacher, applied particularly to a reinterpretation of 
the Covenant model as the external manifestation of the 
progressive unfolding of God's plan and the dynamics of God's 
grace, Schleierrnacher stresses that in order to make sense of 
the idea that creation continually depends upon God, we must 
see that what God did in the beginning_, in bringing the world 
into being out of nothingJcontinues over time in a development 
process. Therefore, there is ultimately only one creative 
divine decree and action spanning the whole of history 1 one 
which becomes ever more clear and ·real at each subsequent 
stage of growth. It is this same decree that brought the 
human race into being at a lower level of existence and 
gradually lifted it up to higher levels of consciousness: each 
level meaning a correspondingly higher level of God-
consciousness. ·If the basic tenet and raison d • etre for 
creation as God • s first Covenant, was the establishment of 
communion (cf pp. 40,87), then we can see that each subsequent 
Covenant was the concretization of this intens in accordance 
with the human appropriation of God's grace,and the level of 
freedom of self-transcendence that is elicited. Each covenant 
or stage of 11 Law 11 from creation (or the incipient awareness in 
humankind of it) to Christ, reflects then the appropriate 
level of exchange and communion that humans, Israel or the 
Church are capable of at that stage of their moral growth. A 
stage becomes •sinful' if it becomes an end in itself, 
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retarding growth to the next stage of transcendence and 
providing a justification for resistance to grace. As people 
become more aware of their responsibility they become more 
God-conscious. Sin is the refusal to respond, thus, to this 
new awareness: not a fall from a higher form of existence, but 
a refusal to rise to a higher level of loving communion with 
God (cf p. 70). This refusal becomes concretised in ingrained 
behavioural patterns of people as well as their social 
institutions, which 
redemption and the 
Christian thinking. 
accounts for the universal need of 
enduring category of original sin in 
It could also be argued that a similar 
refusal is what characterises the situation in the heavenly 
realm and why Paul and other New Testament authors can depict 
the cosmos as being under the grip of powers of darkness (cf 
p. 85). This accounts for the element of the tragic in all 
sin, because our refusal to respond to grace is also 
precipitated, not only in ourselves ("flesh" weakened by 
inherited sin) , but also in the influence of the fallen 
angels, who work to retard the influence of God's Spirit. So, 
while much of what is bizarre in creation can be seen as 
dynamics in evolutive maturation, there is also an element of 
destructive retardation, which can only be fully explained 
against the background of a spiritual rebellion. 
3.3. Creation of the 'Soul' (The Dust that Thinks) 
3.3.1. General 
We have given an explanation as to how God is ultimately 
resposible for the physical dynamics that bring forth human 
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life (cf pp. 85-92): It remains to explain how God sets God's 
self as the horizon enabling Personality in humans to emerge. 
In his study of the psychic life of baboons,Marais came to the 
conclusion that there are three stages in the pathway of 
mental evolution. 14 The first is when a living being is 
dominated by what Marais calls phyletic memory,which is purely 
instinctive behaviour quite determinate in character. It is 
established over many years in a species. Certain 
advantageous actions within a certain environmen~ become 
established selectively in a species and evolve into 
hereditarily established tendencies (what we have called 
instinct, cf pp. 69,76). The second stage of development is 
where the phyletic memory is still dominant and yet the 
individual causal memory begins to take root . Most of the 
mammals have reached the apex of their development at this 
stage. The third stage of development is where the individual 
causal memory begins to dominate. It is this new 'mind' that 
made possible the human achievement of adaptation to almost 
every environmental condition the earth has to offer. 
However, Marais notes in this regard: 15 
"The new mentality does not take the place of the old -
they exist side by side. When the new mentality has 
become dominant, as in the chacma, the old mentality has 
become functionally submerged, but it is still there. In 
the primate the relation of the new mentality to the old 
one is of reason towards instinct." 
Phyletic memories are inherited,whereas causal memories are 
14. Eugene Marais, 1974, The Soul of the Ape, 
Penguin) , p. 62 
15. Ibid., pp. 67-68 
(London: 
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not. The only thing that causal memories pass on to a new 
generation is the ability to accumulate knowledge in a totally 
new way (the relational capacity of humans, cf pp. 38, 76). 
From the protective veil of ignorance that characterises the 
womb, a child is brought into the world and must begin the 
long path to adulthood. There is a principle of biology 
(recapitulation) that is generally accepted: that in embryonic 
development, the evolutionary path of a particular species is 
retraced in broadest outline (cf p. 58). From what has been 
said (cf pp. 76-80), it is not difficult to see that our 
embryonic development1 from fertilised ovum to infanc~ retraces 
the early evolutionary history of our species, from a simple 
cellular form to hominid. This is obviously, and will always 
remain, only an analogical outline. However, we can by 
extending the analogy, hold that our development from infancy 
to adulthood characterises the conscious evolution from 
hominid to modern human beings. It is precisely this 
conclusion that Marais makes himself: 16 
"The phyletic history of the primate soul can be clearly 
traced in the mental evolution of the human child. The 
highest primate, man, is born an instinctive animal. All 
its behaviour for a long time after birth is dominated by 
the instinctive men tali t y. Then, as it grows, the new 
mentality slowly, by infinite gradations, emerges. The 
early sign of its dawning is the dim appearance of memory, 
and a mother's first glad exclamation in recognition of 
the coming has always been 'my baby remembers'. Its mind 
can register, vaguely and uncertainly at first, an 
16. Ibid., p. 78 
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individual causal memory. And it is here that the 
wonderful transition occurs, a transition which the 
phyletic evolution of the soul of the chacma exemplifies. 
As the new soul, the soul of individual memory slowly 
emerges, the instinctive soul becomes just as slowly 
submerged." 
In our introduction we have already referred to creation's 
fingerprint which is embedded in our nature (cf p. 1), and 
later we referred to the three stages of Lonergan (cf p. 63), 





we believe1 give us a framework 
the emergence of Personality, 
for 
the 
individual causal memory takes prominence over the phyletic 
memory. This framework is further ratified by the cognitive 
stages depicted in the study of Piaget and the moral stages of 
Lawrence Kohlberg. With the latter, -Lonergan's movement from 
experience to understanding is echoed in the preconventional 
stage with its punishment/reward orientation; the movement 
from understanding to judgement is echoed in the conventional 
stage with its social orientation; and the movement from 
judgement to value and decision, is echoed in the most 
conventional stage
1
with its orientation of conscience. 
3.3.2. The Emergent Image of God 
We have noted that each Covenant, from creation until Christ, 
was a concretization of God's intent for communion with people 
(cf p. 91) in accordance with the human appropriation of God's 
growth and the level of freedom (Personality) or self-
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transcendence that it elicited. Marx was right in stating 
that our primary activity is work (cf p. 54) , and in the 
church's teaching, it is through work that we develop our 
faculties and begin to transcend ourselves (cf p. 35). We 
have also noted that work is the natural expression of the 
instructive potential of any synthesis ( cf p. 69) . Work is 
the particular way in which we express our subjective and 
objective stewardship (cf p. 21). It is within the dynamic 
for survival, for securing our dominion over creationJthat God 
first sets God's self as the horizon to our growth. In the 
tension created by having to move from experience to 
understanding (objective to subjective stewardship), our first 
synthesis of Personality emerges. Precisely at which stage 
this occurred in the evolution of humankind is not altogether 
clear (cf pp. 78-79), nor is it clear whether it happened in 
many simultaneously or in one (cf pp. 33,79). The question of 
monogenism or polygenism. like the question of transitional 
forms (cf p. 73), is as yet unclear. What is accepted 
universally is monophyletism: 17 that humankind evolved 
ultimately from one stem or stock, and that within this 
evolution, it is one variant that can claim the title Homo 
sapien sapiens . We have seen how essence and existence are 
mutually dependent, how they both expand in unison (cf 
pp. 5, 87). So the division amongst scientists (cf pp. 78-79) 
is somewhat begging the question, for the use of tools, 
however primitive, already. witnesses to this dynamic. This 
dynamic we have already referred to in the idea of 'guided 
17. Nicholas Corte, 1959, The Origin of Man, (London: Burns & 
Oates), p. 84 
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evolution' of Teilhard (cf p. 90). In the Fathers, 
Augustine's idea of seminal causes echoes this insight: 18 
In 
"In all corporeal things, through all the elements which 
compose the world, there are to be found certain seminal 
causes, thanks to which, at the right time and in the 
appropriate circumstance, they burst forth in their 
foreseen time according to their modes and ends." 
the transition from knowledge to judgement, our 
interrelatedness is what brings forth the consideration of 
value and enables us to move beyond the limited horizon of 
survival. We have already seen that it is only within a 
social context, in being confronted with the Personality of 
others, that our own subjective perceptions of reality can be 
put to the penetrating gaze of adequacy, coherence and 
existential relevance (cf p. 66). In this confrontation with 
other Personalities, we are able to transcend ourselves and 
begin to tentatively understand our own dignity and uniqueness 
in the image of God. 
Lastly the tension that this transition sets in motion, is 
what enables the final emergence of value and conscience. We 
have already noted in the writings of Heidegger (cf pp. 47-
48), that, within the tensions of existence, we recognize that 
death is the ultimate framework of our human potential. These 
tensions are the anthropological constants that we discover in 
our human life (cf p. 66), pushing us to that horizon in which 
we are 'hearers• (cf p. 65) and opening us to a full encounter 
with God, who is the horizon beyond death (cf pp. 25-28). In 
this final encounter, we realise that the fullness of our 
18. Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 2,21 
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Personalities depend, in the last analysis, on God: for the 
love of God is freedom and it is given to intensify our 
freedom further. The measure of our Personalities, the scope 
of our essenceJ is discovered to be dependent on a twofold 
decision. On the one hand, God's free election in the Holy 
Spirit, setting God's presence as our horizon, and on the 
other hand, our willingness to die to that order of things 
that restrict this new freedom (cf p. 29) and our perseverence 
in consolidating this freedom in the concrete decision of our 
lives (Ga 9:16-18) Segundo in discussing the Christology of 
Paul concludes: 19 
"Today we possess some of the categories that might be 
more suitable for the expression of Paul's thought. One 
important category is that of evolutionary creation. It 
enables us to appreciate Paul's tour de force in 
attributing two different times of existence and causality 
to one and the same reality; -Christ, the time of absolute 
beginning and the time of specific irruption into history. 
Insofar as the first is concerned, our present-day 
category of evolutionary creation enables us to say that 
the human being came on the scene, from the very first 
moment of its existence, with the 'Flesh' that always 
characterizes it. By the same token, however, that 
category also obliges us to say that the human being, as a 
being destined to be brother or sister of the Son of God, 
came on the scene with the "Spirit". In some primordial 
form1 that Spirit, from the very beginning, made possible 
the saving and liberating attitude known as faith." 
19. Segundo, Humanist Christology, p. 156 
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Conclusion 
Perhaps what is most characteristic of our own time is that we 
live in an age of rapid and substantial change. Whether this 
change is seen to be useful or harmful, whether we will be 
able to direct it constructively, depends a lot on our 
understanding of what is most valuable in being human. We 
have tried in this study to look back in history and draw 
inferences about who we really are. That history is still 
incomplete, but we hope that some of the insights of this 
study will help us to face the future. The value of this is 
encapsulated by Janet Soskice as follows: 1 
"The death of man and even the collapse of ideology will 
have achieved nothing if they are merely the overtures to 
nihilism. The task now is not to lose the human subject 
but to recover for her or him a proper place. And for 
this we need a hope which is to be found fully in God ... it 
is this graced self-abandonment to the future of God 
that, according to Rahner, makes hope not an opiate for 
the people, but on the contrary, that which both commands 
and empowers them to trust enough to undertake anew an 
exodus out of the present into the future." 
1. Janet M. Soskice, 1994, The God of Hope, Doctrine and Life 
44:4, pp. 195-207 
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On ............ . 
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Is ............. Isaiah 
Jb ............. Job 
Jdt ............ Judith 
Jg ............. Judges 
Jl ............. Joel 
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Jude ........... Jude 
K •••••••••••• Kings 
2 K ............ 2 Kings 
* * * * * 
Lk ............. Luke 
Lm ............. Lamentations 
Lv ............. Leviticus 
l M ............ l Maccabees 
2 M ............ 2 Maccabees 
Mi ............. Micah 
Mk ............. Mark 
Ml ............. Malachi 
Mt ............. Matthew 
Na ............. Nahum 
Nb ............. Numbers 
Ne ............. Nehemiah 
Ob . ............ Obadiah 
p •...•••.•... Peter 
2 P . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Peter 
Ph ............. Philippians 
Phm ............ Philemon 
Pr . ............ Proverbs 
Ps . ............ Psalms 
Qo . ............ Ecclesiastes/Qoheleth 
Rm . ............ Romans 
Rt ............. Ruth 
Rv ............. Revelation 
s ............ Samuel 
2 s ............ 2 Samuel 
Sg ............. Song of Songs 
Si ............. Ecclesiasticus/Ben Sira 
Tb ............. Tobit 










Ws . . . . . . . . . . . . . Wisdom 
Zc ............. Zechariah 
Zp ............. Zephaniah 
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